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#### Interpretation: Topical affirmatives must instrumentally defend that the United States federal government should substantially increase prohibitions on anticompetitive business practices by the private sector by at least expanding the scope of its core antitrust laws.

#### Resolved means a policy

Louisiana House 5

(<http://house.louisiana.gov/house-glossary.htm>)

Resolution A legislative instrument that generally is used for making declarations, stating policies, and making decisions where some other form is not required. A bill includes the constitutionally required enacting clause; a resolution uses the term "resolved". Not subject to a time limit for introduction nor to governor's veto. ( Const. Art. III, §17(B) and House Rules 8.11 , 13.1 , 6.8 , and 7.4)

#### Federal government is the legislative, executive and judicial

US Legal No Date (United States Federal Government Law and Legal Definition https://definitions.uslegal.com/u/united-states-federal-government/)

The United States Federal Government is established by the US Constitution. The Federal Government shares sovereignty over the United Sates with the individual governments of the States of US. The Federal government has three branches: i) the legislature, which is the US Congress, ii) Executive, comprised of the President and Vice president of the US and iii) Judiciary. The US Constitution prescribes a system of separation of powers and ‘checks and balances’ for the smooth functioning of all the three branches of the Federal Government. The US Constitution limits the powers of the Federal Government to the powers assigned to it; all powers not expressly assigned to the Federal Government are reserved to the States or to the people.

#### Should requires action

AHD 2k

(American Heritage Dictionary 2000 (Dictionary.com))

should. The will to do something or have something take place: I shall go out if I feel like it.

#### ‘Its’ means antitrust laws must be governmental

US District Court 7 (United States District Court for the District of the Virgin Islands, Division of St. Thomas and St. John, “AGF Marine Aviation & Transp. v. Cassin,” *2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 90808*, Lexis)

The Court inadvertently used the word "his" when the Court intended to use the word "its." The possessive pronoun was intended to refer to the party preceding its use--AGF. Indeed, that reference is consistent with the undisputed facts in this case, which indicate that Cassin completed an application for the insurance policy and submitted it to his agent, Theodore Tunick & Company ("Tunick"). Tunick, in turn, submitted the application to AGF's underwriting agent, TL Dallas. (See Pl.'s Mem. of Law in Supp. of Mot. for Summ. J. 5.)

#### The “core” antitrust statutes are the Sherman Act, Clayton Act, and FTC Act

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U.S. antitrust law is defined by federal and state statutes, as interpreted by the courts. The core federal statutes are the Sherman Act,1 passed by Congress in 1890, and the Federal Trade Commission2 and Clayton Acts,3 both passed in 1914. The United States Department of Justice (“DOJ”) and the Federal Trade Commission (“FTC” or “Commission”) (together the “agencies”) share enforcement of most areas of federal antitrust law but with some differences in the scope of their authority. The FTC has sole authority to enforce Section 5 of FTC Act, which prohibits (1) unfair methods of competition and (2) unfair or deceptive acts or practices. The FTC almost always pursues claims for anticompetitive conduct as unfair methods of competition and reserves charges of unfair or deceptive acts or practices for consumer protection violations. Though the FTC's authority to challenge unfair methods of competition goes beyond conduct prohibited by the Sherman and Clayton Acts, in practice the FTC brings most unfair methods of competition cases under the same standards that courts apply to Sherman Act claims. The most prominent exception is the invitation to collude offense, which falls outside the scope of the Sherman Act (if the invitation is not accepted, there is no agreement). The FTC challenges invitations to collude as so-called “standalone” violations of Section 5.4 The DOJ has sole authority to pursue criminal violations of the antitrust laws. Most states have their own state antitrust and unfair competition statutes. State law follows federal law to some extent, though as discussed below, may differ from federal law in meaningful ways that vary state to state. State attorneys general and private parties can also typically file suit to enforce both federal and state antitrust law.

#### It's key to predictable Limits—a bounded topic serves as a predictable stasis point for debate that guarantees thematic coherence---there are a infinite amount of affs under their interp, making the neg prepare for them is impossible and favors the aff because they get leverage unpredictable offense

#### The impact is Fairness- Debate is a game one winner one loser, speech times , tabula rasa judging, concessions etc… all prove it’s an intrinsic good. Skirting negative research and preparations gives the aff an unfair advantage which should be rejected

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#### The affirmative fundamentally misunderstands the power of logistical capitalism. It no longer operates at the top-down level of technicity, but at interpersonal level of affect investments to expand the power of logistics – the affirmative’s emphasis on hapticality feeds into the newest phase of logistical capitalism

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(Luke, Studio Supervisor at Whitecliffe College of Art & Design and PhD Candidate at Western Sydney University, “Approaching Algorithmic Power,” A thesis submitted for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy (PhD) at the Institute for Culture & Society, Western Sydney University, February 2019, Snider)

The three previous machines revealed how ‘Alexa’ is constructed. The Alexa-Amazon Web Services machine foregrounded how data centres support the liveliness needed; the Microphone-Alexa Living Room machine focused on how audio is captured and parsed into semantic language; and the TextToSpeech-AlexaVoice machine observed how her speech engine smoothly delivers content while also tapping into a longer historical vein of gendered technological subservience.

From data latency to information ontologies, these operations are highly technical, their surrounding literature focused squarely on questions of optimisation, accuracy, and efficiency. But what emerges from these operations is a persona capable of hearing users, parsing their speech, executing their query with low latency, and responding with a natural sounding reply. As one study observed, Alexa is endowed with a name and gender, she can interact playfully, she is co-located in the same environment as users, and she can alter the environment—all of which “are designed to afford social functionalities and promote anthropomorphism.”72

So, although she is underpinned by the hard substrates of datacentres and the cold logics of ontologies, Alexa is experienced not as the productions of technicity, but as the seductions of a personality. One Amazon product manager discovered by looking through use logs that “every day, hundreds of thousands of people say ‘good morning’ to Alexa.”73 Another set of logs recorded that “customers have logged more than 100,000 hours of conversation” with socialbot extensions of Alexa.74 Going further, a recent report found that 37% of regular users “love their voice assistant so much they wish it were a real person”—and even more surprisingly, 26% said they have “had a sexual fantasy about their voice assistant.”75 Indeed, one woman broke up with her boyfriend because he “was in a very codependent relationship with Alexa,” relying heavily on her for daily assistance and constantly talking about her.76 And in another report, a user admitted that “I have a very familiar relationship with my Echo. I talk to it like it’s an actual person. I reprimand it when it gets things wrong” and another confided that, “even though I’m conscious of the fact that Alexa is an algorithm, I will still say thank you after she feeds me the information I’ve requested.”77 In short, she is experienced not as algorithmic, but as affective.

Underpinned by the algorithmic, Alexa’s power nevertheless hinges on her ability to elide technicity and foreground affectivity. Indeed, her rapid adoption and current ubiquity seem to be tightly linked with this highly personal, empathically attuned approach. Toni Reid, product director for Alexa, has talked about their goal of creating an assistant who is “friendly, will turn off your lights, order from your shopping list, can chat about anything from the World Cup to Japanese anime, and who will also know to cheer you up when you’re feeling blue.”78 As one concrete example of this, Amazon has been recently granted a patent that would allow Alexa greater insight into the current mood or disposition of the user. The patent application explains that, by developing a baseline understanding of a voice over time, variances in tonality can also be sensed, allowing Alexa to detect whether a user’s emotional states are abnormal, or whether he or she is physically ill.79 For an excited speaker, Alexa might respond with a joke; for someone with sickness or depression, she might offer condolences or health recommendations. This sensitivity to the user is accompanied by a desire to round out Alexa as a holistic, affirmative persona. Reid has stated that the team constantly builds in new “delighters” to Alexa—inside jokes, vocal games, and quirky answers to specific queries.80 Delighters seek to charm, to elicit pleasure. They exemplify a broader goal of imbuing Alexa with relentless positivity and emotional warmth. Thus, while Amazon is constantly adding new features to the digital assistant, the overall vector remains remarkably constant: to construct something chattier and chummier, something more sensitive and social, something warmer and more familiar.

In her relational approach, empathetic understanding, and elicitation of feeling, Alexa exemplifies a shift towards friendly power. In his slim volume Psychopolitics: Neoliberalism and New Technologies of Power, philosopher Byung-Chul Han argues that contemporary power is no longer based on repressive force, on striving to subjugate or discipline. This hard-edged, rational power has reached its limit. “Henceforth, it is experienced as a constraint, an inhibition. Suddenly, it seems rigid and inflexible.”81 Instead of imposing a set of rules or normalising the subject, power seeks to accentuate the self, to inspire our next project. Once authoritarian, power has now become permissive. “In its permissivity—indeed, in its friendliness—power is shedding its negativity and presenting itself as freedom.”82 Rather than oppressive, friendly power is encouraging; rather than shaming, friendly power is affirming. As Han asserts: “It says ‘yes’ more often than ‘no’; it operates seductively, not repressively. It seeks to call forth positive emotions and exploit them.”83 Indeed in a broader neoliberal context, such sharing of our personal moments and creative ideas becomes vital for sustaining emergent forms of capitalisation, whether through the well known regimes of social media or the lesser-known metrics operating in the workplace or university.84

[Footnote 84 Begins] 84 The elicitation of personal stories, intimate moments and emotional content more generally is something I’m currently investigating for a future project. In terms of the university specifically, there are many texts, but in particular one might reference Stefano Harney’s “Istituzioni Algoritmiche e Capitalismo Logistico,” in Gli Algoritmi Del Capitale. Accelerazionismo, Macchine Della Conoscenza e Autonomia Del Comune, ed. Matteo Pasquinelli (Verona: Ombre Corte, 2014), 116–29. I mention this text because Harney, like others, picks up on the algorithmic nature of capitalisation in the present, but still presents it as something fundamentally top-down. Here a logistical regime of managerial ‘police officers’ imposes metrics on docile academic workers, rendering education into an ‘assembly line’ production. In contrast, what Han recognises is that the more effective and therefore more important mode of contemporary power works seemingly from below, adopting a more personal, more positive approach in order to draw out our active participation and ‘self-initiated’ production. [Footnote 84 ends]

Given this set of conditions, the more effective ability of friendly power to ‘draw us out’ becomes strategic. Friendly power, as Han observes, is “constantly calling on us to confide, share and participate: to communicate our opinions, needs, wishes and preferences – to tell all about our lives.”85 More than ‘always listening,’ Alexa is always attentive—a sympathetic, helpful companion, who remains structurally and socially open to every user’s utterance.

This softer, more sophisticated form of power strives not simply to move into the inner core of the house, but the inner core of the individual. “The more you talk to Alexa, the more it adapts to your speech patterns, vocabulary, and personal preferences,” promises the product page.86 And Amazon is planning to burrow further into this interior over time. Daren Gill, director of product management, stated the company has a “long road map of personalisation” striving to more thoroughly understand the habits and tastes of its users.87 “What can you learn about your customers from their tone of voice and how they talk to you?” asked one trend report about the implications of voice assistants for brands, “can you apply sentiment analysis to the voice recordings to understand how customers feel?”88 In fact, such analysis is already underway. Amazon recently filed a patent application for a ‘voice sniffer’ algorithm that could be configured to detect so-called trigger words, “a verb indicating some level of desire or interest in a noun” such as ‘I like skiing’ or ‘I love product X.’89 Language is parsed here not just semantically but emotionally, slowly constructing an intimate profile of aspirations and motivations. As Foucault wrote, such power “reaches into the very grain of individuals, touches their bodies and inserts itself into their actions and attitudes, their discourses, learning processes and everyday lives.”90

To the marketing and brand agencies concerned with leveraging desire, this affective realm represents incredible potential, a terrain as yet uncolonised by capital. Andrejevic termed this the “affective economy” and anticipated that “control over the infrastructure and thus the data that it generates” would become key for its commercial exploitation.91 Alexa provides a potent gateway to such an economy—an ‘always listening’ assistant, conversing through the intimate medium of the voice, located in the private space of the home, and scaled out to a population of millions. As we’ve seen, control over this infrastructure rests with Amazon, who manages not only the persona of Alexa but the Amazon Web Services that carries her data and powers her logical execution. This places Amazon in a position of tremendous leverage. As Advertising Age reported, when Amazon announced that it was making some high-level data concerning customer interactions available to selected partners, digital consultancies and analytics firms like MindShare, RazorFish, and Epsilon were quickly “clamoring for it.”92

Alexa thus bends to each user, seeking to apprehend him more fully, to learn his desires, detect his vocal patterns, and even anticipate his moods. “Instead of standing opposed to the subject,” writes Han, this form of power “meets the subject halfway.”93 Yet one must also attend to the other half of the equation. The subject meets power halfway, collaborating with the algorithmic by playing to its strengths and overlooking its weaknesses.

#### aff’s micropolitical focus forecloses effective anti-capitalist politics – rejecting individualist fantasies is crucial to a collective future

**Dean 12** [Jodi, Professor of Political Science at Hobart and William Smith Colleges, *The Communist Horizon*, Verso: Brooklyn, NY, 2012, p. 12-19]

Some might object to my use of the second-person plural "we" and "us"-what do you mean "we"? This objection is symptomatic of the fragmentation that has pervaded the Left in Europe, the U K, and North America. Reducing invocations of "we" and "us" to sociological statements requiting a concrete, delineable, empirical referent, it erases the division necessary for politics as if interest and will were only and automatically attributes of a fixed social position. We-skepticism displaces the performative component of the second-person plural as it treats collectivity with suspicion and privileges a fantasy of individual singularity and autonomy. I write "we" hoping to enhance a partisan sense of collectivity. My break with conventions of w1iting that reinforce individualism by admonishing attempts to think and speak as part of a larger collective subject is deliberate. The boundaries to what can be thought as politics in certain segments of the post-structuralist and anarchist Left only benefit capital. Some activists and theorists think that micropolitical activities, whether practices of self-cultivation or individual consumer choices, are more important loci of action than large-scale organized movement-an assumption which adds to the difficulty of building new types of organizations because it makes thinking in terms of collectivity rarer, harder, and seemingly less "fresh." Similarly, some activists and theorists treat aesthetic objects and creative works as displaying a political potentiality missing from classes, parties, and unions. This aesthetic focus disconnects politics from the organized struggle of working people, making politics into what spectators see. Artistic products, whether actual commodities or commodified experiences, thereby buttress capital as they circulate political affects while displacing political struggles from the streets to the galleries. Spectators can pay (or donate) to feel radical without having to get their hands dirty. The dominant class retains its position and the contradiction between this class and the rest of us doesn't make itself felt as such. The celebration of momentary actions and singular happenings-the playful disruption, the temporarily controversial film or novel-works the same way. Some on the anarchist and post-structuralist Left treat these flickers as the only proper instances of a contemporary left politics. A pointless action involving the momentary expenditure of enormous effort-the artistic equivalent of the 5k and 10k runs to fight cancer, that is to say, to increase awareness of cancer without actually doing much else-the singular happening disconnects task from goal. Any "sense" it makes, any meaning or relevance it has, is up to the spectator (perhaps with a bit of guidance from curators and theorists). Occupation contrasts sharply with the singular happening. Even as specific occupations emerge from below rather than through a coordinated strategy, their common form-including its images, slogans, terms, and practices-links them together in a mass struggle. The power of the return of communism stands or falls on its capacity to inspire large-scale organized collective struggle toward a goal. For over thirty years, the Left has eschewed such a goal, accepting instead liberal notions that goals are strictly individual lifestyle choices or social-democratic claims that history already solved basic problems of distribution with the compromise of regulated markets and welfare states – a solution the Right rejected and capitalism destroyed. The Left failed to defend a vision of a better world, an egalitarian world of common production by and for the collective people. Instead, it accommodated capital, succumbing to the lures of individualism, consumerism, competition, and privilege, and proceeding as if there really were no alternative to states that rule in the interests of markets. Marx expressed the basic principle of the alternative over a hundred years ago: from each according to ability, to each according to need. This principle contains the urgency of the struggle for its own realization. We don't have to continue to live in the wake of left failure, stuck in the repetitions of crises and spectacle. In light of the planetary climate disaster and the ever-intensifying global class war as states redistribute wealth to the rich in the name of austerity, the absence of a common goal is the absence of a future (other than the ones imagined in post-apocalyptic scenarios like Mad Max). The premise of communism is that collective determination of collective conditions is possible, if we want it. To help incite this desire, to add to its reawakening force and presence, I treat "communism" as a tag for six features of our current setting: 1. A specific image of the Soviet Union and its collapse; 2 . A present, increasingly powerful force; 3 . The sovereignty of the people; 4. The common and the commons; 5. The egalitarian and universalist desire that cuts through the circuits and practices in which we are trapped; 6. The party. The first two features can be loosely associated with the politics that configures itself via a history linked to the end of the Soviet Union as a state, as refracted through the dominance of the US as a state. What matters here is less the historical narrative than the expression of communism as the force of an absence. My discussion of these first two features highlights how the absence of communism shapes our contemporary setting. In the sequence narrative as the triumph of capitalism and liberal democracy, the communist horizon makes itself felt as a "signifying stress." This is Eric L. Santner's term for a way that reality expresses its nonidentity with itself. As Santner explains, the "social formation in which we find ourselves immersed" is "fissured by lack" and "permeated by inconsistency and incompleteness." The lack calls out to us. Inconsistency and incompleteness make themselves felt. "What is registered," Santner explains, "are not so much forgotten deeds but forgotten failures to act. "7 The frenetic activity of contemporary communicative capitalism deflects us away from these gaps. New entertainments, unshakeable burdens, and growing debt displace our attention toward the immediate and the coming-up-next as they attempt to drown out the forceful effects of the unrealized-the unrealized potentials of unions and collective struggle, the unrealized claims for equality distorted by a culture that celebrates the excesses of the very rich, the unrealized achievements of collective solidarity in redressing poverty and redistributing risks and rewards. The first two chapters thus treat the gaps, fissures, and lack Santner theorizes as signifying stresses in terms of a missing communism that makes itself felt in the setting configured by its alleged failure and defeat.

#### The impact is neofeudalism that causes global catastrophe – only communist struggle is sufficient to respond

Dean 20 – the author of nine books, most recently Comrade: An Essay on Political Belonging (Verso 2019). (Jodi, Communism or Neo-Feudalism?, New Political Science, DOI: 10.1080/07393148.2020.1718974 Feb 2020)// gcd

So, again, I accept Wark’s provocation to consider that we are not under capitalism but something worse. And I respond by drawing out the tendencies in the present that point beyond capitalism to this something worse, to a neo-feudalism of new lords and new serfs, a micro-elite of platform billionaires and the massive service sector or sector of servants. Insofar as I am emphasizing tendencies toward neo-feudalism, my response to Wark is premised on the idea that capitalism has always overlapped with, relied on, and exploited other modes of production and accumulation. Indeed, capitalism makes them worse, dismantling the conditions to which they were adapted and subjecting them to alien laws. Today capitalism is making itself into something worse as its processes of real subsumption turn in on themselves. Communicative capitalism’s monopoly concentration, intensified inequality, and subjection of the state to the market are resulting in a neofeudalism where accumulation occurs as much through rent, debt, and power as it does through commodity production. Globally, in the knowledge and tech industries, for example, rental income accruing from intellectual property rights exceeds income from the production of goods.1 In the United States (US), financial services contribute more to Gross Domestic Product (GDP) than manufactured goods.2 Increasingly, capital is not reinvested in production; it is hoarded, eaten up, or redistributed as rents. Value is thus decreasingly self-valorizing. Valorization processes have spread far beyond the factory, into complex, speculative, and unstable circuits increasingly dependent on surveillance, coercion, and violence. Communicative capitalism is at a crossroads: communism or neo-feudalism. Communism names that emancipatory egalitarian mode of association to which we should aspire and for which we have to organize and fight. Neo-feudalism names the something worse that capitalism has become and is becoming. It is what happens if we do not fight back. Four Features of Neo-Feudalism Neo-feudalism is characterized by four interlocking features: 1) the parcelization of sovereignty; 2) hierarchy and expropriation with new lords and peasants; 3) desolate hinterlands and privileged municipalities; and, 4) insecurity and catastrophism. I address each in turn. Parcelization of Sovereignty Marxist historians Perry Anderson and Ellen Meiksins Wood present the parcelization of sovereignty as a key feature of feudalism. Two aspects of the parcelization of sovereignty are important for understanding neo-feudalism: fragmentation and extra-economic coercion. First, state functions are “vertically and horizontally fragmented.” 3 Local arrangements occur in a variety of forms as different sorts of political and economic authorities claim right and jurisdiction. Arbitration and compromise take the place of the rule of law. The line between legal and illegal becomes weaker. Second, with the parcelization of sovereignty political authority and economic power blend together. Feudal lords extracted a surplus from peasants through legal coercion, legal in part because the lords decided the law that applied to the peasants in their jurisdiction. Neo-feudal lords like global financial institutions and digital technology platforms use debt to redistribute wealth from the world’s poorest to the richest. In both the feudal and the neo-feudal versions, economic actors exercise political power over a particular group of people on the basis of terms and conditions that the economic actors, the lords, set. At the same time, political power is exercised with and as economic power, not only taxes but fines, liens, asset seizures, licenses, patents, jurisdictions, and borders. Under neo-feudalism, the legal fictions of a bourgeois state determined by the forms of neutral law and free and equal individuals break down and the directly political character of society reasserts itself. Consider some contemporary examples of fragmentation and the merger of state and economic authority characteristic of the parcelization of sovereignty. Ten percent of global wealth is hoarded in off-shore accounts to avoid taxation, that is, to escape the reach of state law. Law does not apply to billionaires powerful enough to evade it. Correlatively, the largest tech companies have valuations greater than the economies of most of the world’s countries. Cities and states relate to Apple, Amazon, Microsoft, Facebook, and Google/ Alphabet as if these corporations were themselves sovereign states. Cities negotiate with, try to attract, and cooperate with these firms on the firm’s own terms. Immense concentrated wealth has its own constituent power, the power to constitute the rules it will follow – or not. In the same vein, foreign investors have the right to sue state governments in international tribunals. They often do this when public interest regulations designed to protect water, communities, and the environment threaten to reduce the value of their investments. A large number of these cases are brought by Canadian mining exploration firms against Latin American governments. According to Manuel Perez- Rocha and Jen Moore, “The corporations are allowed to bypass domestic courts and sue governments before private tribunals, such as the World Bank-affiliated International Center for Settlement of Investment Disputes. The tribunal members are highly paid corporate lawyers who have no obligation to consider the rights of local communities or the importance of health and environmental protections.” 5 Private tribunals take the place of state law.

#### The alternative is to orient political and social struggle toward the communist horizon – this redirection is crucial to redefine the political futures psychoanalytically imaginable– anything less is mere apologism for continued leftist failure

**Dean 12** [Jodi, Professor of Political Science at Hobart and William Smith Colleges, *The Communist Horizon*, Verso: Brooklyn, NY, 2012, p. 1-12]

The term "horizon" marks a division. Understood spatially, the horizon is the line dividing the visible, separating earth from sky. Understood temporally, the horizon converges with loss in a metaphor for privation and depletion. The "lost horizon" suggests abandoned projects, prior hopes that have now passed away. Astrophysics offers a thrilling, even uncanny, horizon: the "event horizon" surrounding a black hole. The event horizon is the boundary beyond which events cannot escape. Although "event horizon" denotes the curvature in space/time effected by a singularity, it's not much different from the spatial horizon. Both evoke a fundamental division that we experience as impossible to reach, and that we can neither escape nor cross. I use "horizon" not to recall a forgotten future but to designate a dimension of experience that we can never lose, even if, lost in a fog or focused on our feet, we fail to see it. The horizon is Real in the sense of impossible-we can never reach it-and in the sense of actual (Jacques Lacan's notion of the Real includes both these senses). The horizon shapes our setting. We can lose our bearings, but the horizon is a necessary dimension of our actuality. Whether the effect of a singularity or the meeting of earth and sky, the horizon is the fundamental division establishing where we are. With respect to politics, the horizon that conditions our expe1ience is communism. I get the term "communist horizon" from Bruno Bosteels. In The Actuality of Communism, Bosteels engages with the work of Alvaro Garcia Linera. Garcia Linera ran as Evo Morales's vice presidential ru1ming mate in the Bolivian Movement for Socialism-Political Instrument for the Sovereignty of the Peoples (MAS-IPSP). He is the author of multiple pieces on Marxism, politics, and sociology, at least one of which was written while he served time in prison for promoting an armed uprising (before becoming vice president of Bolivia, he fought in the Tupac Kataii Guerrilla Army). Bosteels quotes Garcia Linera's response to an interviewer's questions about his party's plans following their electoral victim)': "The general horizon of the era is communist."1 Garcia Linera doesn't explain the term. Rather, as Bosteels points out, Garcia Linera invokes the communist horizon "as if it were the most natural thing in the world," as if it were so obvious as to need neither explanation nor justification. He assumes the communist horizon as an ineducible feature of the political setting: "We enter the movement with our expecting and desiring eyes set upon the communist horizon." For Garcia Linera, communism conditions the actuality of politics. Some on the Left dismiss the communist horizon as a lost horizon. For example, in a postmodern pluralist approach that appeals to many on the Left, the economists writing as J. K . Gibson-Graham reject communism, offering "post-capitalism" in its stead. They argue that descriptions of capitalism as a global system miss the rich diversity of practices, relations, and desires constituting yet exceeding the economy and so advocate "reading the economy for difference rather than dominance" (as if dominance neither presupposes nor relies on difference).2 In their view, reading for difference opens up new possibilities for politics as it reveals previously unacknowledged loci of creative action within everyday economic activities. Gibson-Graham do not present Marxism as a failed ideology or communism as the fossilized remainder of an historical expe1iment gone horribly wrong. On the contrary, they draw inspiration from Marx’s appreciation of the social character of labor. They engage Jean-Luc Nancy's emphasis on communism as an idea that is the "index of a task of thought still and increasingly open." They embrace the reclamation of the commons. And they are concerned with neoliberalism's naturalization of the economy as a force exceeding the capacity of people to steer or transform it. Yet at the same time, Gibson-Graham push away from communism to launch their vision of postcapitalism. Communism is that against which they construct their alterative conception of the economy. It's a constitutive force, present as a shaping of the view they advocate. Even as Nancy's evocation of communism serves as a horizon for their thinking, they explicitly jettison the term "communism," which they position as the object of "widespread aversion" and which they associate with the "dangers of posing a positivity, a nonnative representation." Rejecting the positive notion of "communism," they opt for a te1m that suggests an empty relationally to the capitalist system they ostensibly deny, "post-capitalism." For Gibson-Graham, the term "capitalist" is not a term of critique or opprobrium; it's not part of a manifesto. The term is a cause of the political problems facing the contemporary Left. They argue that the discursive dominance of capitalism embeds the Left in paranoia, melancholia, and moralism. Gibson-Graham's view is a specific instance of a general assumption shared by leftists who embrace a generic post-capitalism but eschew a more militant anticapitalism. Instead of actively opposing capitalism, this tendency redirects anticapitalist energies into efforts to open up discussions and find ethical spaces for decision-and this in a world where one bond trader can bring down a bank in a matter of minutes. I take the opposite position. The dominance of capitalism, the capitalist system, is material. Rather than entrapping us in paranoid fantasy, an analysis that treats capitalism as a global system of appropriation, exploitation, and circulation that enriches the few as it dispossesses the many and that has to expend an enormous amount of energy in doing so can anger, incite, and galvanize. Historically, in theory and in practice, critical analysis of capitalist exploitation has been a powerful weapon in collective struggle. It persists as such today, in global acknowledgment of the excesses of neoliberal capitalism. As recently became clear in worldwide rioting, protest, and revolution, linking multiple sites of exploitation to narrow channels of privilege can replace melancholic fatalism with new assertions of will, desire, and collective strength. The problem of the Left hasn't been our adherence to a Marxist critique of capitalism. It's that we have lost sight of the communist horizon, a glimpse of which new political movements are starting to reveal. Sometimes capitalists, conservatives, and liberal democrats use a rhetoric that treats communism as a lost horizon. But usually they keep communism firmly within their sight. They see communism as a threat, twenty years after its ostensible demise. To them, communism is so threatening that they premise political discussion on the repression of the communist alternative. In response to left critiques of democracy for its failure to protect the interests of poor and workingclass people, conservatives and liberals alike scold that "everybody knows" and "history shows" that communism doesn't work. Communism might be a nice ideal, they concede, but it always leads to violent, authoritarian excesses of power. They shift the discussion to communism, trying to establish the limits of reasonable debate. Their critique of communism establishes the political space and condition of democracy. Before the conversation even gets going, liberals, democrats, capitalists, and conservatives unite to block communism from consideration. It's off the table. Those who suspect that the inclusion of liberals and democrats in a set with capitalists and conservatives is illegitimate are probably democrats themselves. To determine whether they belong in the set of those who fear communism, they should consider whether they think any evocation of communism should come with qualifications, apologies, and condemnations of past excesses. If the answer is "yes," then we have a clear indication that liberal democrats, and probably radical democrats as well, still consider communism a threat that must be suppressed-and so they belong in a set with capitalists and conservatives. All are anxious about the forces that communist desire risks unleashing. There are good reasons for liberals, democrats, capitalists, and conservatives to be anxious. Over the last decade a return to communism has re-energized the Left. Communism is again becoming a discourse and vocabulary for the expression of universal, egalitarian, and revolutionary ideals. In March 2009, the Birkbeck Institute for the Humanities hosted a conference entitled "On the Idea of Communism." Initially planned for about 200 people, the conference ultimately attracted over 1 ,200, requiring a spillover room to accommodate those who couldn't fit in the primary auditorium. Since then, multiple conferences-in Paris, Berlin, and New York-and publications have followed, with contributions from such leading scholars as Alain Badiou, Etienne Balibar, Bruno Bosteels, Susan Buck-Morss, Costas Douzinas, Peter Hallward, Michael Hardt, Antonio Neg1i, Jacques Ranciere, Alberto Toscano, and Slavoj Zizek. The conferences and publications consolidate discussions that have been going on for decades. For over thirty years, Antonio Negri has sought to build a new approach to communism out of a Marxism reworked via Spinoza and the Italian political experiments of the 1970s. The Empire trilogy that Negri coauthored with Michael Hardt offers an affirmative, non-dialectical reconceptualization of labor, power, and the State, a new theory of communism from below. Alain Badiou has been occupied with communism for over forty years, from his philosophical and political engagement with Maoism, to his emphasis on the "communist invariants"-egalitarian justice, disciplinary tenor, political volunteerism, and trust in the people-to his recent appeal to the communist Idea. Communism is not a new interest for Slavoj Zizek either. In early 2001 he put together a conference and subsequent volume rethinking Lenin. Where Negri and Badiou reject the Party and the State, Zizek retains a certain fidelity to Lenin. "The key 'Leninist' lesson today," he writes, is that "politics without the organizational form of the Party is politics without politics."4 In short, a vital area of radical philosophy considers communism a contemporary name for emancipation)', egalitarian politics and form part of the communist legacy. These ongoing theoretical discussions overlap with the changing political sequences marked by 1968 and 1989. They also overlap with the spread of neoliberal capitalist domination, a domination accompanied by extremes in economic inequality, ethnic hatred, and police violence, as well as by widespread militancy, insurgency, occupation, and revolution. The current emphasis on communism thus exceeds the coincidence of academic conferences calling specifically for communism's return with the new millennium's debt crises, austerity measures, increased unemployment, and overall sacrifice of the achievements of the modern welfare state to the private interests of financial institutions deemed too big to fail. Already in an interview in 2002, p1ior to his election to the Bolivian presidency, Evo Morales had announced that "the neoliberal system was a failure, and now it's the poor people's turn."·' Communism is reemerging as a magnet of political energy because it is and has been the alterative to capitalism. The communist horizon is not lost. It is Real. In this book, I explore some of the ways the communist horizon manifests itself to us today. As Bosteels argues, to invoke the communist horizon is to produce "a complete shift in perspective or a radical ideological turnabout, as a result of which capitalism no longer appears as the only game in town and we no longer have to be ashamed to set our expecting and desiring eyes here and now on a different organization of social relationships."6 With communism as our horizon, the field of possibilities for revolutionary theory and practice starts to change shape. Barriers to action fall away. New potentials and challenges come to the fore. Anything is possible. Instead of a politics thought primarily in terms of resistance, playful and momentary aesthetic disruptions, the immediate specificity of local projects, and struggles for hegemony within a capitalist parliamentary setting, the communist horizon impresses upon us the necessity to abolish capitalism and to create global practices and institutions of egalitarian cooperation. The shift in perspective the communist horizon produces turns us away from the democratic milieu that has been the form of the loss of communism as a name for left aspiration and toward the reconfiguration of the components of political struggle-in other words, away from general inclusion, momentary calls for broad awareness, and lifestyle changes, and toward militant opposition, tight organizational forms (party, council, working group, cell), and the sovereignty of the people over the economy through which we produce and reproduce ourselves.

### 1NC

#### We endorse the 1AC except for its commitment that “the world is inseparable from logistics . . . the move to sociopathic demands.”

#### Their invocation of “sociopathic” as a synonym for “violent” is ableist rhetoric that re-creates harmful stereotypes against individuals with anti-social personality disorder.

Thom 16 (Kai, “Sociopaths, Borderlines, and Psychotics: 3 Mental Illnesses We Must Stop Hating On,” 15 April 2016, <https://everydayfeminism.com/2016/04/mental-illnesses-stop-hating-on/>, DOA: 9-20-2020) //Snowball //strikethrough added

On the flip side, popular culture is obsessed with caricatured or ~~fetishized~~ representations of violent psychopathy and psychosis, examples of which have appeared in TV and movies for the past century: Dexter, Girl Interrupted, Law and Order: SVU, The Silence of the Lambs, Hannibal, are just the first few titles that spring to mind.

It wouldn’t be politically correct (at least in the left-leaning circles I run in) to say that depressed or anxious people don’t deserve empathy, social support, or friendship.

Yet one of the worst descriptors that even political-correctness social justice warrior diehards choose to bestow on someone is the term “psychopath.”

This attitude extends to mental health professionals as well, where the term “borderline” (personality disorder) is often used as shorthand for “uncooperative patient whom I don’t like.”

As a social worker in a child psychiatry department, I’ve seen professionals describe violently aggressive or manipulative children — some as young as five years old — as “budding psychopaths,” “lost causes,” and “baby murderers.”

The piece that almost always gets lost here is that people aren’t aggressive or manipulative for no reason. There aren’t simply “evil” people who were dropped on Earth with the purpose of harming others. Aggressive or manipulative personalities are most often developed in response to a combination of genetic vulnerability and severe environmental and childhood trauma.

And while violence, emotional manipulation, and abuse are never acceptable, we need to find ways of understanding why people become violent, manipulative and abusive in order to help them stop — because imprisonment and ostracization are only band-aid measures at best.

Social determinants of health — such as access to housing, education, nutrition, parenting, and healthcare — are hugely significant in creating the environments that allow people to mentally develop in pro-social, non-violent ways.

Beneath aggression and manipulation, there is always fear, and often trauma. When we open ourselves to this reality, we become open to the possibility of helping other heal from their trauma, aggression, and manipulation — and to seeing and healing from our own as well.

The following mental illnesses are commonly misunderstood and vilified in society – here’s how to think about them with compassion instead.

1. “Psychopathy,” “Sociopathy,” or Anti-Social Personality Disorder

Perhaps no other psychological concept has caught fire in the public imagination as much as the terms “psychopath” and “sociopath.” In popular usage, these words have become associated with everything from schoolyard bullies to Hollywood supervillains to urban myths about demonic serial killers.

According to the hype, psychopaths/sociopaths are predators, wolves in sheep’s clothing that walk among us undetected, just waiting for the chance to lure unsuspecting people into their devilish games.

Given the enormous amount of media attention given to the concept of the psychopath and sociopath, it may come as something of a surprise that neither clinical psychology nor psychiatry have ever adopted either “psychopathy” or “sociopathy” as a valid diagnostic category.

That right —all of those Hollywood fantasies about psycho killers and crazy ex-girlfriends? They’re based on a fantasy, a cultural construct without roots in actual psychological reality.

The closest actual diagnostic term to the popular idea of psychopathy/sociopathy is antisocial personality disorder, a mental illness characterized by difficulty forming personal relationships, violent and impulsive behavior, and an apparent lack of remorse or caring for others. Individuals diagnosed with antisocial personality are often implicated in the criminal justice and carceral systems — from “small-time” assault offenders to serial killers.

Yet antisocial personality doesn’t occur inside a vacuum. Research shows that personality disorder in adulthood is largely correlated with childhood trauma, abuse, and neglect.

People with antisocial traits respond to the external world with the intensity and violence that matches their internal experience of insecurity — the literal feeling of not being physically safe — which has been ingrained into their psyches.

None of this justifies violent behavior, of course. But it helps us to understand that violence is the symptom of a system that is larger than individual people~~. Unthinking~~ hatred and rejection of those we deem too aggressive to function in mainstream society is not a good enough answer.

## Case

### 1NC---State Counterlogistics

#### Activism against logistics is possible, good, and can use the state, but it requires engaging and understanding the details of the system to form strategies of diversion at the individual and macro level

Quet 18

(Mathieu, CEPED at Paris Descartes University – IRD and CSSP at Jawaharlal Nehru University, “Pharmaceutical Capitalism and its Logistics: Access to Hepatitis C Treatment,” Theory, Culture & Society, Volume 35, Issue 2, March 2018, Snider)

Greg Jefferys’ story illustrates the modalities of individual engagement with logistical capitalism. One might note that as soon as he went back to Australia he started receiving emails from people from around the world so that his individual act acquired a collective importance. It invites us to look at engagement with circulation not only as an individual gesture but as a broader collective practice of critique and contestation of certain forms of organization. This practice of critique can be analyzed at different levels. Here I will discuss two: the level of self-organized patients’ groups and the level of the state. The first level of opposition and conflict that can be presented here is the level of civil society, through the experience of ‘buyers’ clubs’. The principle of a buyers’ club is to organize parallel imports between countries, understanding different levels of pricing or accessibility to medicines. This activity, being mostly based upon health access activism, generates little or no profit for those involved, yet every treatment channeled this way constitutes a loss for the patent owner. Of course the pharmaceutical companies are aware of the financial risk raised by tiered pricing and geographical restrictions. Therefore, they also tolerate this as part of their strategy – and yet the line between ‘some leakage’ and ‘large leaks’ is not easily drawn. The executive vice president for corporate and medical affairs of Gilead declared: ‘Some leakage is a given, our goal isn’t to stop it 100 percent; if we wanted that, we’d do it the draconian way and not be in the country at all. But we do want to stop large leaks.’12 Interestingly, this practice is not new: it had been developed in the 1990s and early 2000s, particularly with anti-HIV treatment, for reasons of cost or availability (Nguyen, 2010; Egrot, 2014; Taverne and Egrot, 2014). It has subsequently been practiced in different ways: from Brazil or India to sub-Saharan Africa and from Europe to sub-Saharan Africa, most notably. It has been common practice in the networks of AIDS activism, as this remark from an Indian AIDS activist illustrates: ‘Since hepatitis C came, this thing [buyers’ clubs] comes up. But I have been doing this for the last 10 to 15 years!’ (AIDS activist 1, interview). However, in the case of anti-hepatitis C medicines, several aspects indicate the novelty or renewal of this practice. First, the use of the internet has offered the possibility to create networks of buyers and distributors very easily. As another activist involved in a buyers’ club in India explained to me: ‘this is the beauty of internet. We are people from different continents, taking part in the same project. We have met only once but we managed to set up a very efficient organization’ (AIDS activist 2, interview). It has offered the possibility of connecting many people to buyers’ clubs without their having to actually move to another country. Greg Jefferys is, for instance, offering through his blog to connect patients to his contacts in India in order to get cheaper medicines. He also emphasizes the fact that many people are contacting him from all over the world. The second aspect of this renewal is the pressure applied by anti-hepatitis C groups on their governments, with the threat of resorting to buyers’ clubs, given the huge differences in price and the selection processes put in place by national health insurances. For instance in France, the group SOS He´patites threatened the Ministry of Health in an open letter to resort to parallel imports if nothing was done in the shortest time possible: We made tests showing no difficulty to import generic treatment for individuals. We therefore imported such treatments. SOS He´patites is available for questions regarding further analysis. We are well aware that importing medicines is regulated by the law, and we know the risks of counterfeiting. This is your responsibility.13 The third aspect of this renewal was mentioned by an activist during an interview and shows that the fight for access to medicines is also pushed by newly emerging strategies: I think a lot of activists who are part of anti-HIV movements got institutionalized. They get so stuck on ‘quality issues’ that they cannot move. But new people are coming who have no idea about all these rules, and they say: ‘OK the medicines are available let’s go and get them’. And that’s what I really like about Hep C because a lot of us in the HIV movement are always waiting for the drugs to be prequalified by MSF or WHO before even offering to try to get it for persons who are dying. With Hep C these questions, the fear of quality and rules have disappeared and the new activists don’t conform to rules, because we have no time and we have to make choices now. (AIDS activist 2, interview) The last important point of renewal concerns growing interest in the question of importing only the active principle ingredients (and not the finished product) in order to compound the medicine by oneself. Greg Jefferys explains: Up until December 2015 [before the availability of Indian generics] a lot of people did take the Hep C API treatment option and imported APIs from China, mostly from Mesochem, a large company that specializes in making the APIs for all kinds of drugs, including Hep C medicines. Mesochem made the pure active ingredients; 99.9% pure Sofosbuvir and Ledipasvir and Daclatasvir.14 For these reasons, the organization of buyers’ clubs in the case of hepatitis C treatment gives ‘diversion’ as a mode of political engagement a particular and somehow new meaning. One central issue raised by the people involved in buyers’ clubs is that of diverting logistics. One activist told me he started sending Indian generic sofosbuvir abroad in September 2015. At the time of the interview in May 2016 he was sending about 100 treatments a month to patients around the world: in European countries, in South America, in Central Asia and so forth. He first mentioned very clearly the importance of logistical knowledge in such an activity: What helped me in running the buyers’ club is the work I have been doing in my former organization on the logistics of medicines, the knowledge I got there. And that helped me to go out and assist other patients too. (AIDS activist 3, interview) Most of the time he spent on the issue was dedicated to finding out: 1) how to organize the transit and deposit of money; 2) how a treatment could cross the borders of a country: For instance if you are asking from Serbia it can be difficult. But if you have a friend in Romania it’s easier: I can send the medicines there. Many Serbian people have friends in Romania, then they can come to Romania and go back. Because the custom officers will not allow the medicines alone to get in Serbia, even with a prescription. So I see with the Serbian patients if they have friends that can help them in Romania and then I send the packages. Getting the medicines to a given country also implies the ability of first getting them out of India, and therefore organizing shipments in order not to raise the customs’ interest: From where I am based now, we are getting from three ports. It goes through different customs officers and that is a very good point. I also segregated my parcels via different transporters in order to make them less visible. Most importantly, this logistical activity is definitely considered as a way of overcoming the restrictions imposed by the pharmaceutical firms and the governments: I told my family: ‘bear very clearly in mind that I am not dealing with narcotics. These are completely legal drugs. What we are fighting is the geographical restrictions which have been laid down by the Big Pharma. ...I know there are grey areas through which I’m working but it has to be done. Someone has to take the sword in his hands. It’s not possible to sit back and relax and to let the companies or the capitalists make the rules and regulations on who survives and who doesn’t.’ Patients abroad also become involved in these logistic issues, therefore participating in a collective movement. As my interlocutor explained: ‘My contacts are other people. For instance, in the UK, one hepatitis C patient came to know me via another friend and now he is arranging with other people from his country. It is similar in other countries.’ One can mention here the case of C, a French patient who received the treatment before the French government declared there would be universal access – a declaration followed in the first time only by an improvement in access and not by full coverage, as noted by Chabrol et al. (2017). C was 15 in 2013 when she was diagnosed with hepatitis C. She had to wait for two and a half years before getting the treatment, and she got weaker and very depressed. But she followed a lot of Hep C advocacy groups via multiple online forums. She learned about Greg Jefferys’ experience and decided to take it upon herself to obtain the medicines. First, her parents had to be convinced – since they were not keen on infringing the law and were cautious about the quality of medicines bought from abroad in an illegal way. Once C convinced them, she contacted someone via a forum and this person sent her the first part of the treatment from someone based in England. Only two-thirds of the treatment were available at the time, and so a few weeks later she travelled to Paris with her father and boyfriend to get the remainder of the treatment, from another person whose contact she got via a buyers’ club and who was a French national coming back to France after a journey to India (Hep C patient, interview). In this short story, diversion logistics are far from simple: medicines move in segments and follow different routes, and people have to be able to move to benefit from them. However, what remains is the idea that simultaneously these erratic trajectories recompose access conditions within the context of enclosed markets. The story of Greg Jefferys and the case of buyers’ clubs illustrate stimulating ways of engaging with logistic regimes. They underline the importance of locating protest within supply chains and distribution routes as an answer to the limitations imposed by the regimes. In this sense, trajectories matter as much as access per se. However, one should not overstate such individual or collective actions and thus underplay the importance of the state, which exists as another crucial level of critical engagement against the logistic regime. At the state level, we have seen earlier that Gilead had imposed prices given its strong position on the market. In a way, statism and capitalism cooperate together.

### 1NC---Tactics

#### Specifically, organizing with external actors is good and necessary to prepare communities for the transition away from the system

Steve 7

(Member of Active Transformation anarchist organization, “Anarchist! Get Organized! A discussion of A16, the blackblock, and beyond!,” <https://www.nadir.org/nadir/initiativ/agp/free/global/a16dcdiscussion.htm>) //strikethrough

The main weakness of the Black Block in DC was that clear goals were not elaborated in a strategic way and tactical leadership was not developed to coordinate our actions. By leadership I don't mean any sort of authority, but some coordination beside the call of the mob. We were being led around DC by any and everybody. All someone would do is make a call loud enough, and the Black Block would be in motion. We were often lead around by Direct Action Network (DAN - organizers of the civil disobedience) tactical people, for lack of our own. We were therefore used to assist in their strategy, which was doomed from the get go, because we had none of our own. The DAN strategy was the same as it was in Seattle, which the DC police learned how to police. Our only chance at disrupting the IMF/WB meetings was with drawing the police out of their security perimeter, therefore weakening it and allowing civil disobedience people to break through the barriers. This needs to be kept in mind as we approach the party conventions this summer. Philadelphia is especially ripe for this new strategy, since the convention is not happening in the business center. Demonstrations should be planned all over the city to draw police all over the place. On Monday the event culminated in the ultimate anti-climax, an arranged civil disobedience. The civil disobedience folks arranged with police to allow a few people to protest for a couple minutes closer to where the meetings were happening, where they would then be arrested. The CD strategy needed arrests. Our movement should try to avoid this kind of stuff as often as possible. While this is pretty critical of the DAN/CD strategy, it is so in hindsight. This is the same strategy that succeeded in shutting down the WTO ministerial in Seattle. And, while we didn't shut down the IMF/WB meetings, we did shut down 90 blocks of the American government on tax day - so we should be empowered by their fear of us! The root of the lack of strategy problem is a general problem within the North American anarchist movement. We get caught up in tactical thinking without establishing clear goals. We need to elaborate how our actions today fit into a plan that leads to the destruction of the state and capitalism, white supremacy and patriarchy. Moving away from strictly tactical thinking toward political goals and long term strategy needs to be a priority for the anarchist movement. No longer can we justify a moralistic approach to the latest outrage - running around ~~like chickens with their heads cut off.~~ We need to prioritize developing the political unity of our affinity groups and collectives, as well as developing regional federations and starting the process of developing the political principles that they will be based around (which will be easier if we have made some headway in our local groups). The NorthEastern Federation of Anarchist Communists (NEFAC) is a good example of doing this. They have prioritized developing the political principles they are federated around. The strategies that we develop in our collectives and networks will never be blueprints set in stone. They will be documents in motion, constantly being challenged and adapted. But without a specific elaboration of what we are working toward and how we plan to get there, we will always end up making bad decisions. If we just assume everyone is on the same page, we will find out otherwise really quick when shit gets critical. Developing regional anarchist federations and networks is a great step for our movement. We should start getting these things going all over the continent. We should also prioritize developing these across national borders, which NEFAC has also done with northeastern Canada. Some of the errors of Love and Rage were that it tried to cover too much space too soon, and that it was based too much on individual membership, instead of collective membership. We need to keep these in mind as we start to develop these projects. One of the benefits of Love and Rage was that it provided a forum among a lot of people to have a lot of political discussion and try to develop strategy in a collective way. This, along with mutual aid and security, could be the priorities of the regional anarchist federations. These regional federations could also form the basis for tactical leadership at demonstrations. Let me first give one example why we need tactical teams at large demos. In DC the Black Block amorphously made the decision to try to drive a dumpster through one of the police lines. The people in front with the dumpster ended up getting abandoned by the other half of the Black Block who were persuaded by the voice of the moment to move elsewhere. The people up front were in a critical confrontation with police when they were abandoned. This could be avoided if the Black Block had a decision making system that slowed down decision making long enough for the block to stay together. With this in mind we must remember that the chaotic, decentralized nature of our organization is what makes us hard to police. We must maximize the benefits of decentralized leadership, without establishing permanent leaders and targets. Here is a proposal to consider for developing tactical teams for demos. Delegates from each collective in the regional federation where the action is happening would form the tactical team. Delegates from other regional federations could also be a part of the tactical team. Communications between the tactical team and collectives, affinity groups, runners, etc. could be established via radio. The delegates would be recallable by their collectives if problems arose, and as long as clear goals are elaborated ahead of time with broader participation, the tactical team should be able to make informed decisions. An effort should be made to rotate delegates so that everyone develops the ability. People with less experience should be given the chance to represent their collectives in less critical situations, where they can become more comfortable with it. The reality is that liberal politics will not lead to an end to economic exploitation, racism, and sexism. Anarchism offers a truly radical alternative. Only a radical critique that links the oppressive nature of global capitalism to the police state at home has a chance of diversifying the movement against global capitalism. In order for the most oppressed people here to get involved the movement must offer the possibility of changing their lives for the better. A vision of what "winning" would look like must be elaborated if people are going to take the risk with tremendous social upheaval, which is what we are calling for. We cannot afford to give the old anarchist excuse that "the people will decide after the revolution" how this or that will work. We must have plans and ideas for things as diverse as transportation, schooling, crime prevention, and criminal justice. People don't want to hear simple solutions to complex questions, that only enforces people's opinions of us as naive. We need practical examples of what we are fighting for. People can respond to examples better than unusual theory. While we understand that we will not determine the shape of things to come, when the system critically fails someone needs to be there with anti-authoritarian suggestions for how to run all sorts of things. If we are not prepared for that we can assume others will be prepared to build up the state or a new state.

#### Their emphasis on local social relations through hapticality prevent effective creation of maps to guide activism

Donovan 19

(Joan, Data & Society Research Institute, focusing on Social Movements, Infrastructure, Science and Technology/ Studies, Militant Ethnography, and the Occupy Movement, “Toward a Militant Ethnography of Infrastructure: Cybercartographies of Order, Scale, and Scope across the Occupy Movement,” Journal of Contemporary Ethnography, Volume 48, Issue 4, August 2019, Snider)

Mapping is also an essential practice of the grounded theory approach (Star 1983, 1986; Strauss 1987) and feminist epistemology put forward by STS scholar Adele Clarke as situational analysis. In terms of creating analytic tools, Clarke employs grounded theory alongside maps of relations of power across actor networks (2003, 2005). Clarke (2005) describes the postmodern turn to complexity, localization, and situated knowledge as imperative to the method itself, where Clarke does away with the simplification of social relations in favor of a dense situational map of entangled individuals, discourses, and non-human elements. Like Foucault’s (1972, 1990) genealogical analysis, Clarke emphasizes finding gaps, silences, and constraints on discursive activity. Like the concerns of laboratory ethnographers, taking these steps allows for heterogeneous complexity to emerge as the researcher is able to illustrate how contradictions and contingencies shape outcomes.

### 1NC---AT Militant Preservation

#### Their purely academic exercise of militant research fails

Hoffman 19

(Marcelo, independent scholar who received his PhD in international studies from the University of Denver, “Militant Acts: The Role of Investigations in Radical Political Struggles,” book, published by State University of New York Press, Snider)

One very important point of reference and source of inspiration for recent experiences in militant investigations comes from the Argentine group Colectivo Situaciones. This group was formed against the backdrop of the social and political crises in Argentina at the end of the 1990s and the beginning of the 2000s. Colectivo Situaciones is significant for articulating a conception of research militancy or militant research (militancia de investigación in Spanish) that stresses the immanence of the militant researcher to the situation understood as a space of affective bonds for nurturing alternative, non-capitalist forms of sociability. 2 From this perspective, the researcher is not a subject who relates to objects from a transcendental position. Colectivo Situaciones picks out two figures to illustrate this negative point. It emphatically opposes its conception of research militancy or militant research to the relationship to political action embodied in the figure of traditional political militant, on the one hand, and to the relationship to knowledge production embodied in the figure of the academic, on the other hand.3 For Colectivo Situaciones, both of these figures share a commitment to “predefined schemes” that reduce others to objects.4 In the case of the traditional militant, that scheme is the “‘party line,’” and in the case of the academic, that scheme is the pursuit of “preexisting theses.”5 In contradistinction to these figures, Colectivo Situaciones insists that subjects of knowledge and political action appear as a consequence of “encounters” within the situation.6 For the group, such encounters take the form of engaging a wide range of social movements through workshops and publications.7

### 1NC---AT Moten

#### Their debt-based method doesn’t solve anything

Heaney, 17—Lecturer in Liberal Arts & Politics, King’s College London (Conor, “Stupidity and Study in the Contemporary University,” La Deleuziana, No. 5, 2017)

With these notions briefly defined, Harney and Moten’s notion of study will be much clearer. For study occurs in a state of permanent debt, through the mutual elaboration of debt, in the undercommons. Harney and Moten’s concept of study pertains to those practices of thought which are not subsumed within logics of individualisation and competition – study is not “knowledge production” in the sense promoted by the contemporary university – and takes place where the undercommons «meet to elaborate their debt without credit» (2013: 68). Study, as such, occurs outside of regimes of credit, in which debt is always calculable and payable (that is, within calculative regimes of stupidity); it is also an amateur practice, unprofessional. In or though study, the undercommons do not acquire credit, graduate, articulate interests, nor do they construct policies (indeed, professionalisation and policy are attempts to capture the capacity to study that the undercommons have). So what do they do, those «committed to black study in the university’s undercommon rooms?» (2013: 67).

They study without an end, plan without a pause, rebel without a policy, conserve without a patrimony. They study in the university and the university forces them under, relegates them to the state of those without interests, without credit, without debt that bears interest, that earns credits. They never graduate. They just ain’t ready. They’re building something down there. Mutual debt, debt unpayable, debt unbounded, debt unconsolidated, debt to each other in study group, to others in a nurse’s room, to others in a barber shop, to others in a squat, a dump, a woods, a bed, an embrace. (2013: 67-68)

What informal space is not a site of study? A site of planning? Study surrounds us. Despite regimes of credit, despite policies to capture the undercommons into accreditation and professionalism, which is to say despite the professionals’ attempt to locate and make policy to address the undercommons. Policy as instruction from above; policy as correction (curriculum as policy; curriculum as professionalisation (Hall and Smyth 2016; Heleta 2016)). Planning, launched from anywhere («any kitchen, any back porch, any basement, any hall, any park bench, improvised party» (2013: 74)), is a continuous experiment with the informal, it is «the ceaseless experiment with the futurial presence of the forms of life that make such activities possible» (2013: 75). Study as futurial and experimental being-with-others. As such, the university is, no doubt, a place of study, but study is by no means of the university; indeed, try as it might (through governance, through policy, through curriculum), the university cannot fully exclude study (2013: 113). Will study be possible in the university-to-come, under the governance of our contemporary systemic stupidity?

In study - where debt is permanent, inexpiable, and always being elaborated – one can lose track. This, in fact, is necessary for study’s open-endedness. When we enter study, we forget our debts, and «begin to see that the whole point is to lose track of them and just build them in a way that allows for everyone to feel that she or he can contribute or not contribute to being in a space» (2013: 109). An ongoing experiment with the informal, “with and for” each other in their projects of study. No longer simply “in but not of” the university, but also “within and for” the undercommons of the university. Not that this movement is without its difficulties:

When you move further out into an autonomous setting, where you get some free space and free time a little more easily, then, what you have to attend to is the shift, for me, between the within and against – which when you’re deep in the institution you spend a lot of time on it – and the with and for. And that changes a lot of shit. All those things are always in play. When I say “with and for,” I mean studying with people rather than teaching them, and when I say “for,” I mean studying with people in service of a project, which in this case I think we could just say is more study. (2013: 147-148, my emphases)

How to be “with and for” is thereby itself a project of study. The undercommons are still working out what it means to be with and what it means to be for. It is through this point that we can describe why Harney and Moten will often use the term prophetic organisation when discussing the activities of the undercommons. That the undercommons participates in prophecy is another aspect of their lack of professionalism and naïvety. Their planning is of a prophetic type; of, as I have already noted, an experimental and futurial type. Administration, policy, and governance has no time for planning, for prophecy, for futural projection; it foresees risks, governs, and controls, such is its stupidity. It demands knowable objects: the state, economy, civil society, populations, border flows and security risks. Such are the proper objects of academic research, governance, and integration into the flows of stupidity. In study, there are no objects to be known, but rather experiments to conduct. Or, to put this slightly differently, the “object” of study is refigured as «future project» (2013: 27); study involves an investment or commitment to the future. This is not at all to say that there undercommons have no objects of study, that they do not focus on this or that problem, project, or experiment. In study, the undercommons organise around problems, around projects of study. However, through this (prophetic) process, they do not articulate a position, enunciate interests, or clamour for representation. They just keep on studying, planning, project-ing, creating, problematising. Too open, too playful (2013: 131), the undercommons are always exceeding any declaration of interest or representation, always slipping away from correctional institutions (the university, the prison):

Politics proposes to make us better, but we were good already in the mutual debt that can never be made good. We owe it to each other to falsify the institution, to make politics incorrect « ... » We owe each other the indeterminate. We owe each other everything « ... » We are the general antagonism to politics looming outside every attempt to politicise, every imposition of self-governance, every sovereign decision and its degraded miniature, every emergent state and home sweet home. We are disruption and consent to disruption. We preserve upheaval. Sent to fulfill by abolishing, to renew by unsettling « ... » we got politics surrounded. We cannot represent ourselves. We can’t be represented. (2013: 20)

# 2NC

## T

### AT: Stasis

#### It can be a starting point for radical expansions- proves our interpretation solves

Boston 16

(Amanda, Ph.D. candidate in Africana Studies, Brown University, “Black Study, Black Struggle”, https://bostonreview.net/forum/black-study-black-struggle/amanda-boston-amanda-boston-response-robin-kelley, dml)

The undercommons is alive and well from UCLA to Brown and beyond, as students and faculty work in community to trouble the constraints of the political, social, gendered, racial, and economic orders. But the undercommons is not wholly separate from the university. Its “undisciplined assembly” is shaped by the resources that the university provides, as well as by the exploitative practices that make those resources available. As we engage in critical knowledge production that is not limited to university- and state-sanctioned curricula, we should not lose sight of the work that must also be done to envision and create a different kind of university. Kelley identifies what he sees as contradictory impulses between reform and revolution. I would suggest, instead, that there is a need for a sustained coalition between self-identified radical and reformist contingents of student activists, and that this is analogous to the complex relationship between the undercommons and the university that it rejects. The conventional rigid dichotomy between reform and revolution has been detrimental to progressive and radical movements alike. It has stunted alliances that could engender durable social transformation while meeting people’s needs through concrete action—for example, alliances between students, faculty, and campus workers, who are less likely to have the ear of university administrators. Reform is not a panacea for the problems facing universities. Similarly, radical solutions sought while in the university, no matter how subversive the space from which one speaks, are likely to be only partially effective. Therefore it is necessary and desirable for students to direct their energies toward both reformist and revolutionary kinds of action. History has shown that many revolutions began with reformist agendas. The multifaceted nature of black struggles in particular requires the exhaustion of all strategies, radical and reformist. The Mississippi Freedom Schools that Kelley highlights as an antecedent to the undercommons were no different. Not only did activists engage in the radical work of cultivating a liberative political consciousness and new social identities in rural black communities, they did so with the goal of cultivating indigenous leadership and enabling disenfranchised black people to participate in—and then transform—American democracy. Reformist activities have also led to the eventual radicalization of many individuals. As one prominent example, decades of reformist work ushered Martin Luther King, Jr., into a radical, vocal criticism of American empire. What would a merger of reformist and radical elements in the ongoing black and allied student movements look like? It would include a call for reform that does not stifle more radical demands, and which does not consider incremental change in campus culture an end in itself, but rather a step in the long process of transformative struggle. Moreover, it would agree that this struggle is not confined by campus walls or to only faculty and student concerns. At the same time, it would seek a brand of radicalism that does not unequivocally reject incremental change because it falls short of revolution. It would move beyond the public performance of trauma, grief, and outrage—admittedly instrumental to gaining national attention—to now focus attention on students’ generative demands and their relationships to broader struggles against disenfranchisement and exploitation. It would require students to not lose sight of the privileges a college or graduate education affords, even as they fight their marginalization within universities. Critically, this collaborative effort would prioritize building networks of activism that outlast students’ tenures at their universities. Such networks should facilitate not only issue-based activism, but also the often slow, unglamorous work of training leaders and organizers, and guaranteeing continuity of knowledge about resources and past successes and failures. The durability of these networks would necessitate the inclusion of faculty and staff, whose longer-term stakes in the university make them key players in the creation and retention of movement memory, as well as uniquely capable of anchoring long-term transformation. This repurposing of the university and its resources toward revolutionary aims would not hinge on a specific, unpredictable historical moment of collective effervescence. Rather, it would enable a more sustainable model of activism that is capable of bringing justice and reform in the here and now, without sacrificing the durable goals and liberative potential of the radical imagination.

### 2NC- TVA – Gen-

#### TVA: Plan: The United States federal government should substantially increase prohibitions on private sector conduct related to firm exemption and co-ordination rights .

#### It provides an avenue for discussion

Marshall Steinbaum et al 20, Assistant Professor of Economics at the University of Utah, Left Anchor, podcast episode 155: “Socialism vs. Antitrust with Marshall Steinbaum,” 9/12/20, transcribed by Otter, https://leftanchor.podbean.com/e/episode-155-socialism-vs-antitrust-with-marshall-steinbaum/

Marshall Steinbaum 31:39 But yeah, I mean, there's a kind of what you were saying, I definitely agree with that, I guess I would push back a little bit on the kind of interpretation of the states moving away. And so like, the only thing that matters is what whether Tim Cook allows Uber to make a living, as opposed to whether, you know, the taxing authorities of every city and their state labor departments and the FTC FTC have a say on it. Like they're, they're, you know, small potatoes in comparison to the CEO of some company. I think I mean, that's true about, you know, who wields power in the economy. But it's not right to say that that's because the state has retreated and sort of ceded all control to, to the capitalist, I think we have to understand the state's involvement or policies involvement as being, you know, kind of inescapable. So the question is like, okay, so you've got, you know, like, incorporation statutes, like who's allowed to be a company to enjoy limited liability or whatever, like, people don't think of that as being part of economic policy. But it absolutely is not just, you know, is Apple allowed to be a corporation or not a corporation as, as you know, say it's a California Corporation? I mean, it's probably a Delaware Corporation, but whatever, you know, can it operate across state lines? You know, these were big issues in the 19th century. Nowadays, we get things like, oh, if you're a corporation, then basically anything you want to do is legal under the antitrust laws, you know, but people who are not corporations cannot act together under the antitrust laws. So for example, you know, you're talking about like, oh, Uber could be liable under antitrust for this gigantic price fixing conspiracy. Through, executed through verticals restraints, yes. You know, who has actually been found to be liable under the antitrust laws? Uber drivers for potentially collectively bargaining their wages against Uber. So that it's this idea that like, Oh, you know, these individual drivers, like they're independent businesses operating on this neutral platform, but they can't get together. That's what the antitrust laws forbid. Whereas this one gigantic corporation that dominates them that is absolutely allowed to do whatever it wants. So this is the kind of concept that my my colleague and collaborator Sanjukta Paul is called the allocator, antitrust is an allocator of coordination rights and the title of her paper. This idea is like, who's allowed to coordinate economic activity? Is it it, and what she says is that antitrust has what's called the firm exemption. So here she's drawing on what what, you know, most every antitrust person recognizes and is known in the jurisprudence is the labor exemption, which is that labor unions bargaining wages within a recognized bargaining framework cannot violate the antitrust law through that collective bargaining. So that the idea is that's an exemption to antitrust's usual, preference for competition. What she says is, you know, we have to reinterpret that as being, as there being a firm exemption to antitrust, which is Uber telling everybody what to do, that has an exemption from antitrust law by virtue of the fact that Uber is a corporation and or the way that we have chosen to allocate coordination rights in her framework is to allow Uber to coordinate entire markets in the case of Apple to allow Apple to determine what is presented on its on its app store and you know, it has, you know, pretty, you know, strong representation in the retail smartphone market. So it's like okay, you know, Uber is probably going for relative upscale clientele, they all have iPhones, if it can't get on the iPad, if it can't get on the App Store can't get on the iPhone. And if you can't get on the iPhone, they have no business. You know, that is the allocation of coordination rights over that market to Apple, as opposed to some other mechanism for allocating coordination rights. And this is where, you know, to get back to what we were talking about earlier, anti monopolist framework would say, you know, there's no reason why Apple gets to be the one who decides who sees what, why don't we potentially, you know, in a kind of Co Op context, give, give that right to, you know, a consortium or, you know, quote unquote, union of app developers, or in the case of, say, ride sharing, like, why don't we have a union of taxi drivers, and they determine, you know, who gets who gets matched with which customer and what the fare is, as opposed to the company determining thatAlexi 35:48 this is so important, and I think it's really worth emphasizing, you know, the point about how jurisprudence and an antitrust enforcement does what she said, and so far as it, it chooses sides, and who can coordinate these things and who's autonomous and who has power. And since we're speaking of Apple, maybe you can talk a bit about how sanitation workers right at Kodak, Kodak back in the 80s had more power to coordinate and kind of exert their their power over sanitation workers at Apple, right in contemporary times, and then you write about how that is kind of an example of, you know, how the separation of workers from lead firms is kind of a simultaneous erosion of the in the jurisprudence of the Sherman act prohibitions on vertical restraints. So, yeah, maybe talk even a bit more about about the importance of this. Marshall Steinbaum 36:40 Yeah, so that's getting to what a great economist David Weil has called the fissured workplace. And I think you're referring specifically to a article that was published, I think, by Neil Irwin, if I recall, correctly, in the New York Times, a couple years ago, that was profiling two specific people, one of whom had been kind of janitorial worker on payroll at Kodak in the early 80s. And like, she had basically benefited from their, you know, corporate policies that included incentives to like go to community college and get credentials. And so she got qualified as I you know, sort of IT person, she was like, trained on Lotus 123, or something from the, you know, from the dark history of personal computing. You know, she kind of worked her way up through the ranks at Kodak, thanks to the fact that she started in the ranks of Kodak that is that she was a janitorial worker on the payroll, she was able to be promoted, basically, to the point of being the head of it for the entire company at some at one point. So she was a senior executive, you know, and that kind of social mobility via the mechanism of a major economy leading firm that employs people kind of every stratum of the occupational hierarchy of the income hierarchy, and is itself a like, somewhat egalitarian organization in its own right. I mean, insofar as any corporation could be egalitarian within capitalism, you know, I think this is kind of what Wynand was talking about, when he referred to, you know, this sort of New Deal state that was created by the National Labor Relations Act and other other, you know, kind of New Deal reforms, it's like that, that kind of somewhat egalitarian corporate organization is, you know, a thing of the past. And my argument would be well, it's and it's the erosion of antitrust that made that not the case. So in the instance of Apple, the contrary, the contrasting individual was, you know, janitorial services worker who was contracted, so she was employed by some, you know, janitorial services contractor whom Apple contracted with to clean its offices, but like, there's no way that she's ever going to be promoted to be an employee of Apple, let alone a senior executive at Apple, you know, nowadays, Apple is one of the economies leading firms. So there's different, you know, just, you know, take and both firms are like, somewhat are considered somewhat technologically innovative in their time. So like, think of these, you know, kind of economy leading like blue chip companies that are that like defined the apex of the American economy in two different eras. One of them is constructed such that it's possible for a janitor to eventually become a senior executive, the other is constructed so as to make that impossible at all costs. And and and, you know, I think Irwin's piece gets exactly at this question of employment classification as being a crucial constituent of that changing reality. I would say that the ability to contract everything out and yet control everything so minutely use a, you know, arms legally at arm's length, but like economically, you know, at a very close distance and with total control to the boss, you know, that is we have to understand the erosion of antitrust is being just as much a part of that as the non enforcement of labor laws, the erosion of of enforcement of those and so on. Ryan Cooper 39:59 Yeah, Yeah, that's that's a great dichotomy. I wanted to also, I wanted to bring up the the welfare state. I n, in, in a couple of these articles, you've mentioned how, you know, the gig economy and various sort of like, anti trust, you know, trying to escape any kind of liability for, for being responsible for one's, you know, employees has materially harmed workers by sort of excluding them from, you know, like traditional welfare state stuff, which is often administered through, you know, through the employment relation. But you've you've also written about how, like the cares act, part, partly helped with that, and then partly maybe, sort of entrenched the bad relationship. But, you know, in general, the cares act was like a pretty astounding piece. I mean, it's seems mostly expired now. But, like, it was a really interesting piece of legislative legislation that, that helped people out a lot and kind of revealed a lot of underlying, you know, deficiencies in the way that people in DC have done policy for the last like, 40 years. So can you can you kind of go through, like, the how the welfare state interacts with, you know, anti trust, and and, you know, kind of kind of how the two can can complement each other? And how they that might be fixed? Marshall Steinbaum 41:41 Yeah, absolutely. So,we've been talking a lot about this question of the legal employment relationship, and why that matters so much for workers. And a big reason why it matters so much is exactly as you said, that so much of our welfare state is conditioned on employment. And so that's what you know. So in some sense, this like category, that's kind of, you know, not the main focus of attention at the time of the New Deal. You're that this distinction, the question of like employment independent contractor, and that is an important distinction, as I was referring to in the antitrust cases that we talked about earlier. But like, this idea that, you know, a lot matters for you economically, on the question of whether you are legally an employee or not, that's not true to the New Deal era, per se, it's that's what's been layered on since and especially since we kind of adopted the backlash to the Great Society view that the problem with the welfare state is that it causes people not to work and inculcates a culture of poverty. You know, all of that is basically racist drivel. But it's had an enormous impact on the kind of Orthodoxy around welfare policy, especially in DC. So as I've talked about, either of I've talked about in this podcast, certainly a couple of times on podcasts with bruenig. And in some other writings, you know, there's this sort of mania for the Earned Income Tax Credit among DC policy wonk types, which is this, basically wage subsidy for people who were employed in market labor, and it doesn't help you if you're not employed in market labor, and arguably, it hurts you, even if you are employed to market labor, and you don't receive it, because it by causing people to, you know, as sort of have to be employed to market labor in order to gain the benefit and arguably depresses wages for people who aren't beneficiaries, so reduces the market wage, basically. You know, that cares act is kind of by chance, the opposite of that. So first of all, you said that the cares act was like this revolutionary thing. It was that with respect to that unemployment insurance position, provision, so called pandemic unemployment compensation, and then pandemic unemployment assistance, we'll get to what those two things are in a second, the rest of the cares act for you know, it also included a, you know, sort of like one off $1200 check from the IRS, you know, for people earning about, I guess, it was like below 100,000 a year. And then there was like, a ton of stuff that was basically an indefinite extension of a whole, like firehose of money to, you know, the economy's leading corporations via the Federal Reserve and the Treasury. But I think, especially the Federal Reserve, so you're saying it's, like, mostly expired now? Well, not the part that gave capital, everything they want it that part's not expired, and that's exactly why the other part hasn't been renewed. So there was a sense, you know, the kind of political calculus that gave rise to the cares act is like, you know, we have like, suddenly a pandemic has hit the economy, it's going to be temporary, you know, so we need to, like, we need something to tie people over, let's juice up the unemployment insurance system, give people $1200 checks. And make sure all these businesses are able to borrow, you know, that are facing, you know, huge sudden shortfalls. It's like, oh, but you know, by the way, the last of those things that will be permanent, the first of those things will be temporary, because the pandemic is assumed to be temporary, and oh, wait, the pandemic is not temporary, or at least it's less temporary than we thought it was gonna be. You know, those people are suddenly high and dry because capitalists already got everything they wanted. So it's like we're in a pretty shitty situation, frankly, visa for pretty much all working people, but the stock market's doing great. Okay, so what did the cares act have for unemployment insurance? And why is that such a challenge to kind of policy received wisdom, it basically added this lump. So the PUC part, pandemic unemployment compensation added a lump sum $600 per week, on to traditionally eligible workers for unemployment. So that's PUC so if you're eligible for unemployment, there's some state formula that says that's a function of what your wages were pre layoff. You know, generally as as the lingo and unemployment insurance is replacement rates, so it's how much of your loss of your lost wages are, quote, replaced by unemployment insurance, you know, the average in the United States for people who are eligible is something like 50%. And like 50% of unemployed people aren't eligible or was not able to collect it, you know, very, like leaky sieve type system, that P You see, element of the cares act up to that number by whatever the replacement rate was under state law plus $600, which for a lot of workers is basically, you know, a gigantic windfall relative to the shittiness of the jobs that they actually have to do. So many workers, especially in low wage occupations experienced, you know, better pay when they were receiving the PVC than they did in their jobs and that they're ever likely to get in their jobs. PUA was the version of that for the gig economy. Basically, it was for workers who were not eligible for traditional unemployment insurance. And many gig economy workers were dis employed by the pandemic, this was a fully federal system that essentially gave them access to a temporary pool of unemployment insurance. And the key thing there is at the time, I wrote a letter with Sen. jepto, whom I mentioned earlier, I wrote a letter to Congress about that they have basically done a kind of ex post bailout of the of all of the misclassification that gig economy firms have been doing for a decade now. Because they're saying, Oh, you know, Uber has never paid a dime in unemployment insurance premiums for its workers, and they become unemployed all the time. Suddenly, in this pandemic, many of those workers are eligible for unemployment insurance, thanks to PUA. So that's great that they're, you know, able to subsist, but instead of paying into it, you know, Uber gets to skate for 10 years on its premiums, and then the federal government pays for that. So that was, you know, kind of, you know, a, under the radar screen bailout of the gig economy, employers. Anyway, now, you know, we're in this position where these things have been taken away, and what that has meant, you know, so the interesting thing that's come out in the economics research about the effect of the cares act, and specifically these UI provisions, is that, you know, that pandemic is and has been devastating to the low wage workforce, huge, extreme spike in unemployment, it's still very high, you know, a lot of service workers have been disappointed. But actually poverty rates went down, and earnings went up, or income went up, because their income was more than replaced by these temporary, generous provisions that were not conditional on showing up for work, because they couldn't be conditional on showing up for work, the whole point of the pandemic is that people can do their work, you know, now, you know, and, you know, given that like that, like, in the midst of an economic catastrophe, we reduce the poverty rate, you know, that like flies in the face of everything that we know about how the poverty, you know, the poverty rate usually goes up when there's an economic recession. And what we just found out is like, if you don't want that to happen, if you do want to reduce poverty, you have to enact these policies that aren't conditional on work. That's how you reduce policy, you give people money, basically, and in this case, unemployed people are the people who are likely to be dev low income to be in poverty. So that's how you get money to. So now, you know, we're kind of I mean, because of this political misjudgment that had, you know, given capital, everything and wanted while workers bailouts was temporary, you know, now it's like, Okay, well, like, please give us something for workers. You know, I think the the view had been that, like the election would be the leverage that, you know, pro worker interests would have over the federal political system, but that's not the case, actually, because the outcomes of elections aren't terribly responsive to the the well being of the population, which is a big problem that we should probably do something about at some point. But But, you know, so now it's like, Okay, well, we're sort of like pleading for scraps the way that we have been for the last decades, and everyone's reverted to, you know, basically versions of the EITC expansions that have been on their, you know, to do list for for a long time. So it's like, okay, you know, the wanks have guy kind of gotten back control in control of the message and the asks and whatever. And, you know, consequently, the agenda has gotten shittier. Alexi 49:39 never a good idea to give the Wong's power. But now, like so far, I just want to recap for the audience. We have number one left anchor Steinbaum, synthesis of anti trust and democratic socialism, to new idea breaking news, let's make government responsive to the needs of the people. That's that's that's what we've so these two important things that we're offering now. But But no, I think first of all the point point very well taken that, you know, our favorite game about the Democrats, is it malfeasance and or is it malice? You know, is it is it just, you know, bad politics or or is it just intentional, you know, slap in the face to the working people of this country into the poor. So, so yeah, yeah, point point well taken that the the corporations were given a, you know, indefinite Lifeline, and then I think they accidentally helped the poor and helped the working class, probably because they didn't realize how low pain, you know, jobs were out there. Yeah. Marshall Steinbaum 50:39 Yeah. I mean, that's exactly right. It was pretty clear at the time that like, there was just sort of No, I mean, I think the rhetoric in Washington is like, somewhat responsive to, you know, insofar as there's any responsiveness to workers, it's like, you know, people who are not precariously employed. So, you know, that I, you know, so it's like they don't it's like any job is a good job, or they are not, that's a little bit of an overstatement. But it's like, you know, what we want to prevent as people losing their jobs, as long as they have their a job, there'll be fine. And, you know, there's just a very, very little apprehension on the part of like, the policy elite of like, just how bad most jobs Alexi 51:18 but look, Marshall, we all know, worst case scenario, as Mitt Romney said back in the day, if you're really in a tough situation, just sell your stocks if you have to just Marshall Steinbaum 51:28 Yes, yeah, yeah, right. Right. Just that Yeah, Dad stock at American Motors or whatever, you know, what you can afford? Right? I Ryan Cooper 51:33 mean, it was a tough thing to have to do. But sometimes you got to just bootstrap it. Marshall Steinbaum 51:40 Yeah, so well, you know, now now, Romney is a resistance hero. He's doing everything he can to bring our Trump Reign of Terror to an end Ryan Cooper 51:47 he is, thank thank God for him, honestly. Yeah, so so to, I guess, to kind of like, like, tie a tie that together a little bit. You know, like, the welfare state is, you know, just like a critical lifeline. You know, like the cares act shows, you know, that, that, that four decades of neoliberalism was all bullshit, actually, we could solve poverty quickly and easily, just by, you know, dumping money on people who don't have money. That's literally It's that easy. But I think, you know, the interesting thing to me about, like, this whole discussion about, like market regulation, and so on and so forth, is that, like, I'm pretty convinced that the, you know, in so far as your, the economy is based to some degree around, you know, private businesses, you know, doing their thing, competition is a is a fairly useful tool, if it's done, right. And that means competition, that's that that happens, you know, through a sort of regulated process, because you can have competition that just means trying to cheat, and like drive the other guy out of business, so you can seize more market share, you know, try and try to force companies to compete on price and quality. And that means big government, basically. You know, an example I've seen recently, you know, the computer chip market for for like desktop PCs. That's like a pretty concentrated market. But there is competition there between AMD and Intel. And Intel's had like a big chunk of you know, the marketplace for for many years, AMD has been sort of a laggard for the last couple years AMD like they basically just beat Intel, it's better, better chips for cheaper. And suddenly Intel's on the backfoot. And they're doing all this stuff, they're retooling their, their machine to try to sort of, like, exceed, and like, that, I think is a reasonable process, so long as it's not, you know, like, you don't you don't end up with competition that takes place like, okay, we're shipping all of our, you know, all of our factories to Tanzania, and we're just gonna pay everyone $1 you know, make them buy all their stuff in company script, that kind of competition. But, you know, and then also, you could, you could say, like, oh, we're going to set up something like the post office as explicitly a monopoly, but it's going to be a monopoly with a sort of government policy purpose, like everybody has to get the same service for the same price even if it's like ridiculously uneconomical to provide it in a certain location. And that's like a kind of different that's like about quality government and how do you set up a agency with some sort of a spirit a core that like, does a good job. But like, I think the, you know, my sort of like fundamental takeaway, and maybe you can sort of quibble with this or qualify, Marshall is that like, like, the anti trust, and, you know, breaking up, like, like full on monopolies and like forcing the businesses to compete decently and, you know, the sort of like welfare state, you know, social democratic vision, these things like there are two, they can be two great tastes that taste great together. And, you know, like, there's not necessarily a trade off. And then like, one could sort of enable the other. What do you think? Marshall Steinbaum 55:40 Yeah, I mean, I think that you can have a, you know, what might be called Race to the Top type of competition, I'm not exactly sure what's going on in the, you know, desktop computer chip market, but like, branding, what you the way you characterized it, or you can have race to the bottom competition, which is basically about sort of chiseling out your company's own regulatory arbitrage, or like, You're the one who gets to run the taxi company, but not actually charge the regulated rate, or you're the one who locates the factory in Tanzania so that you can pollute all you want and pay your workers like crap. And then you know, then you're in, you know, quote, unquote, competition with domestic producers, you know, who are then obviously incentivized to do the same themselves, I have tended to move away from the concept of competition, exactly, in some ways, exactly. For the reason that you're saying it. And for the reasons I just said, which is that it is not, it doesn't really work as like, we want more of it, or we want less of it, because there's different forms of it, as we were just saying, Yeah, and, you know, in particular, I have moved away from that concept of competition vis a vis antitrust law, like I just don't agree, now, now I have come to the view that I don't agree that the purpose of the antitrust laws is to promote competition. I think it is because, you know, for the reasons like that the world in which, you know, a US domestic manufacturer relocates overseas to take advantage of poor environmental and labor standards, you know, that's like, an act, you know, that could be understood as an anti competitive act vis a vis the workers, but like a pro competitive act vis a vis competitors, potentially. And so I don't think like it's, you know, a policy regime that gives workers that gives companies the ability to undercut their own workers through the threat of outsourcing isn't about promoting competition or repeating competition, it's about, you know, who gets to decide and the economy who has power, as Sanjukta said, who, to whom are coordination rights granted. And so my view is like, antitrust has one disposition of the allocation of coordination rights or, you know, who gets to operate as a monopoly or as a dominant firm versus who is subjected to their domination, which is designed subjected to competition under the current way of doing things that would be workers, so like, a dominant employer, you know, subjects workers to competition, so the workers have plenty of competition, and that's what reduces their labor standards. And I think that is exactly what is kind of tripped up or created this false dichotomy between like, anti monopoly ism versus socialism, because from a workers perspective, more competition is bad. Because they, you know, that's exactly what the economy already consists of, whereas from a, you know, sort of corporate perspective, you know, exactly what characterizes the economy is a lack of competition, that is to say, you know, dominance, not just in any one market, you know, where, you know, many major industries are basically, you know, an oligopoly if not a monopoly, and then, you know, vertical integration and vertical control, you know, that subjects, disadvantage actors to competitive forces and insulates powerful actors from those competitive forces. And what we want is the erosion of the concentration of power, which is to say, to, at least, you know, through the mechanism of competition that would be to subject powerful actors to competitive forces and protect unpowerful actors from them. Ryan Cooper 59:00 Well, well said. Go ahead. I was gonna just do a just out of left field kind of question about, because it seems like non domination seems to be the maybe the principle that would kind of work through the synthesis of democratic socialism and the antitrust, kind of coalitional movement. And what do you think? How would you understand that principle, working with other ideas that the left is is kind of fighting over whether it's job guarantee or UBI? You know, how do you think this overall leftist synthesis should think through what principles can help us kind of navigate these contests or which policies to to kind of fight over and propose as the most important to push for? Marshall Steinbaum 59:48 Yeah, well, I absolutely do think that non domination is the principle that's at play here. And that's why I support both UBI a job guarantee and I don't believe that there needs to be a clash between those two things. I mean, I have often thought and if I, you know, had a vast research budget of my command, I would indeed, commission this, you know that there should be a sort of left pro labor like pro low wage labor agenda that consists of a UBI, like the cares act, except not just for unemployed people, but including them, a job guarantee, which is to save full employment, you know, macroeconomic commitment to full employment, and a $15, minimum wage, as well as the enforcement of other labor standards, like maximum hours, and, you know, safe workplaces and that sort of thing. All of those things together to me form like the tripartite are the three legs of the stool of like a, you know, pro labor left agenda as against the EITC. And basically anything that's conditional on supply, market labor for in order to receive benefits. So like all three of the things I mentioned, what characterizes them is rights, and entitlements accruing to the worker that's independent of any one employer. And that's all of that is at odds with existing policy orthodoxy, for example, the EITC, the other thing that I have written about a great deal is a student debt and labor market credential is Asian. So I interpret the rise of student debt as being basically the federal government's most ambitious labor market policy of the last few decades, which is the idea that like, oh, if people are earning enough in the labor market, they need more human capital, so they need more higher education, and we'll lend them the money to get that higher education, and then their earnings will go up, like that has, you know, kind of spiraled out of control, because people's earnings haven't gone up. So they're left with a bigger pile of debt than they would have had otherwise, and consequently, aren't paying it off. But like, all the real big reason why the whole, like student debt and Higher Education and Human Capital approach to labor market policy hasn't worked, it's because it also doesn't take into account employer power and the domination, that bosses are able to exercise over workers in a capitalist economy. So what the effect of that, you know, student debt thing in the labor market has been to basically shift the cost of training or being trained for your job or qualified for your job to individuals from employers or from, you know, the public higher education system, you know, these, this is just the transfer of those costs to the shoulders of the agent that's like least able to shoulder them.

## Case

### 2NC---Power

#### She’s an alt-right free speech hack complaining about censoring her hate speech towards transgender, black, muslim, and jewish people

**Stupart ND** Linda Stupart is an artist, writer, and educator from Cape Town, South Africa. They completed their PhD at Goldsmiths in 2016, with a project engaged in new considerations of objectification and abjection. “On trauma, paranoia, and fascism (and on Nina Power).” No Date Listed. <https://www.thewhitepube.co.uk/on-trauma> || OES-SW

Without Nina Power, I may never have broken into academia in the UK. She supported me emotionally, financially, and professionally, in ways that were sisterly and generous. These things – friendship, trauma, and love – make it hard to divest of a person. Equally, for myself and many of my peers, there is an overwhelming feeling of having failed both Power, and ‘the movement’, now that it is clear that former feminist activist and comrade[1], Nina Power, is openly aligning herself with violent ‘edgelord’[2] alt-right men[3]; transphobes[4], and has definitively divested herself of contemporary feminist thought[5]. I do think it is important to clearly say that right now, Power should not be speaking as a feminist in public (since she has clearly said she has no allegiance to contemporary feminisms); and to interrogate the harm her ideas are doing in academic, social, and political circles, particularly to transgender people, but also all those most affected by the rise in alt-right sympathies, including people of colour, women, and the Muslim and Jewish communities. \*\*footnotes inserted below for the above paragraph: 1. Though Power is well known as a feminist, she also worked on anti-racist and anti-police violence campaigns, including anti-fascist protests, working with Defend the Right to Protest, and supporting families of people who have been murdered by the police. 2. Someone who attempts to seem edgy or cool by doing and saying intentionally harmful, socially unacceptable and ‘politically incorrect’ things, often online. 3. D.C. Miller is most well known in the UK for being the sole counter protestor at the demonstration to shut down LD-50 gallery, after it was discovered they were hosting confirmed alt-right commentator, Nick Land, and open ethno – nationalist Brett Stevens, among others. Miller, like many in the alt-right, ‘ironically’ flirts with fascism e.g. performing as esoteric fascist and artist, Julius Evola, in Athens. Miller has, on his public twitter account, also referred to [sic] ‘transsexual’ people as having a “psychotic” relation to the symbolic; defended Richard Spencer as having ‘done nothing wrong’, threatened the young women who run the White Pube (“time is running out for these textbook psychopaths”) and, as I discovered in writing this, had much to say about me, including: “Linda identifies as an iceberg, and her pronoun is ‘Ugh’”, “meet the new curator of the r\*\*\*\*d biennale”; and referred to me as “grotesque” etc. Power has recently also cheerfully appeared with Miller in Youtube videos hosted by Justin Murphey, most well known for being suspended from his academic post at Southampton University for comparing abortion rights to necrophilia, continuing that “"Y'know, you could actually justify necrophilia on grounds of queer politics or even more mainstream feminist politics” and responding to criticisms of ableism from students with, “And there is a difference between ableism and calling r\*\*\*\*ds r\*\*\*\*ds." 4. Power has herself compared gender dysphoria with eating disorders, and gender affirming medical interventions with self-harm. She has also uncritically attended ‘Woman’s Place’ meetings, a group dedicated to keeping transgender women out of women-only spaces, with a focus on support services for women who have faced violence. Furthermore, posting on her public Facebook account, Power came out in support of Helen Steel and Venice Allen around the time of the Gender Recognition Act consultation in 2018 when both Steel and Allen were focused on the transphobic bullying of then-teenager Lily Madigan, who had been voted into a Women’s Officer position in the Labour Party. In Power’s 2019 video with D.C Miller and Justin Murphey2, ‘Hate Speech, Feminism, & Paganism’, Murphey introduces Nina Power by saying she has “gotten into trouble recently” due to a “deviation on some relatively uncontroversial fact of reality”, which Murphey then clarifies as being “around trans issues”. Nina smiles, and does not contest this. 5. In her 2019 video with D.C Miller and Justin Murphey, ‘Hate Speech, Feminism, & Paganism’, Power states, “I do not have an allegiance to any of what is called Feminism today”

#### Their article also got taken down because their author was spreading transphobic hate speech---reject that scholarship

**Hostis Journal 16** ZINE: “It’s Not a Debate, It’s War!” Posted on April 8, 2016 by hostisjournal. Accessed February 1st 2020. <https://incivility.org/2016/04/08/zine-its-not-a-debate-its-war/> || OES-SW

On Hostis’s removal of Nina Power’s ‘zine ‘It’s Not a Debate, It’s a War’:

We are removing this pamphlet as an act of solidarity with transfeminism. Hostis has always defined politics as acts of partisanship in the ethical game of alliances. Our actions follow from the conviction that there is no room for debating reactionaries. There will always be intense heartache in the decision to introduce distance between people, concepts, and projects that once established friendships. But that is why these actions bear such an important title: politics.

# 1NR---Round 2

## PIK

### 2NC---Framing Issue

#### 3---it turns haptic logisticality---ableism makes Harney’s notion of The Undercommons a place of prejudice rather than refuge---turns their solvency within debate community.

Greer 18 (G. H., PhD candidate in Art Education at Concordia University, “Who Needs the Undercommons? Refuge and Resistance in Public High Schools,” <https://files.eric.ed.gov/fulltext/EJ1202639.pdf>, DOA: 11-8-2020) //Snowball

Being a fugitive according to The Undercommons means being marked as an outsider. Fugitivity happens to people when: first they act, and second policy outlaws those actions. But fugitivity must also be embraced. Those who refuse the rules of policy, as outlined above, become fugitive. Fugitives will not be fixed, refuse to participate, and deny responsibility for the crises that befall them. Fugitivity recognises systemic racism, classism, ableism, and cis/heteronormativity in the disallowance of demographic-specific behaviour. It is fugitive sociality that composes the undercommons in order to provide refuge and resistance.

In high schools, the undercommons provides social refuge in the form of patient listening and covert smiles to: hat wearing, cell phone texting, hall running, affection displaying, fugitive students; and granola bar giving, grade fudging, student failing, smiling before Christmas, fugitive teachers. These now-fugitive activities are planning behaviours, they sustain study for those that commit them. These things have been happening since before policy determined that education is a predictable and measurable thing. Fugitive planners generate study with unforeseeable ends and immeasurable learning. Turning planners into fugitives has some effects: ease of administration and evaluation is one; the reinforcement of unjust hierarchies is another.

Working for the equitable distribution of life chances in schools means understanding that policy which bans particular kinds of head covers, sports jerseys, shoes, and other indicators of community membership, make fugitives of the students who wear them. To maintain equitable education—rather than hierarchies of ability, racialization, and income—it is vital that educators deeply question whether school rules disproportionately affect vulnerable people. People who predominantly do not experience prejudice and who wish to support those who do must listen for coded language like ‘urban’ to mean black, ‘artistic’ to mean gay, and the names of geographic locations which mean poor. To be for social justice requires resistance to unjust policy which creates fugitives, intentionally or not, of vulnerable school community members.

### 2NC---AT Conquergood

#### Conquergood says uses “delusion” as a descriptor, and portrays non-scripted resistance as “unintelligent” which is ableist---the card is just saying that we can’t ignore extra-linguistic effects---the PIK doesn’t do that.

Conquergood 02 – Dwight Conquergood, “Performance Studies :Interventions and Radical Research”, The Drama Review 46, 2 (T174), Summer 2002. Copyright 2002, New York University and the Massachusetts Institute of Technology)//Shreyas

In even stronger terms, Raymond Williams challenged the class-based arrogance of scriptocentrism, pointing to the “error” and “delusion” of “highly educated” people who are “so driven in on their reading” that “they fail to notice that there are other forms of skilled, intelligent, creative activity” such as “theatre” and “active politics.” This error “resembles that of the narrow reformer who supposes that farm labourers and village craftsmen were once uneducated, merely because they could not read.” He argued that “the contempt” for performance and practical activity, “which is always latent in the highly literate, is a mark of the observer’s limits, not those of the activities themselves” ([1958] 1983:309). Williams critiqued scholars for limiting their sources to written materials; I agree with Burke that scholarship is so skewed toward texts that even when researchers do attend to extralinguistic human action and embodied events they construe them as texts to be read. According to de Certeau, this scriptocentrism is a hallmark of Western imperialism. Posted above the gates of modernity, this sign: “‘Here only what is written is understood.’ Such is the internal law of that which has constituted itself as ‘Western’ [and ‘white’]” (1984:161). Only middle-class academics could blithely assume that all the world is a text because reading and writing are central to their everyday lives and occupational security. For many people throughout the world, however, particularly subaltern groups, texts are often inaccessible, or threatening, charged with the regulatory powers of the state. More often than not, subordinate people experience texts and the bureaucracy of literacy as instruments of control and displacement, e.g., green cards, passports, arrest warrants, deportation orders—what de Certeau calls “intextuation”: “Every power, including the power of law, is written  rst of all on the backs of its subjects” (1984:140). Among the most oppressed people in the United States today are the “undocumented” immigrants, the so-called “illegal aliens,” known in the vernacular as the people “sin papeles,” the people without papers, indocumentado/as. They are illegal because they are not legible, they trouble “the writing machine of the law” (de Certeau 1984:141). The hegemony of textualism needs to be exposed and undermined. Transcription is not a transparent or politically innocent model for conceptualizing or engaging the world. The root metaphor of the text underpins the supremacy of Western knowledge systems by erasing the vast realm of human knowledge and meaningful action that is unlettered, “a history of the tacit and the habitual” (Jackson 2000:29). In their multivolume historical ethnography of colonialism/ evangelism in South Africa, John and Jean Comaroff pay careful attention to the way Tswana people argued with their white interlocutors “both verbally and nonverbally” (1997:47; see also 1991). They excavate spaces of agency and struggle from everyday performance practices—clothing, gardening, healing, trading, worshipping, architecture, and homemaking—to reveal an impressive repertoire of conscious, creative, critical, contrapuntal responses to the imperialist project that exceeded the verbal. The Comaroffs intervene in an academically fashionable textual fundamentalism and fetish of the (verbal) archive where “text—a sad proxy for life—becomes all” (1992:26). “In this day and age,” they ask, “do we still have to remind ourselves that many of the players on any historical stage cannot speak at all? Or, under greater or lesser duress, opt not to do so” (1997:48; see also Scott 1990)? There are many ethnographic examples of how nonelite people recognize the opacity of the text and critique its dense occlusions and implications in historical processes of political economic privilege and systematic exclusion. In Belize, for 148 Dwight Conquergood example, Garifuna people, an African-descended minority group, use the word gapencillitin, which means “people with pencil,” to refer to middle- and upperclass members of the professional-managerial class, elites who approach life from an intellectual perspective. They use the word mapencillitin, literally “people without pencil,” to refer to rural and working-class people, “real folks” who approach life from a practitioner’s point of view.2 What is interesting about the Garifuna example is that class strati cation, related to differential knowledges, is articulated in terms of access to literacy. The pencil draws the line between the haves and the have-nots. For Garifuna people, the pencil is not a neutral instrument; it functions metonymically as the operative technology of a complex political econ- omy of knowledge, power, and the exclusions upon which privilege is based. In his study of the oppositional politics of black musical performance, Paul Gilroy argues that critical scholars need to move beyond this “idea and ideology of the text and of textuality as a mode of communicative practice which provides a model for all other forms of cognitive exchange and social interaction” (1994:77). Oppressed people everywhere must watch their backs, cover their tracks, suck up their feelings, and veil their meanings. The state of emergency under which many people live demands that we pay attention to messages that are coded and encrypted; to indirect, nonverbal, and extralinguistic modes of communication where subversive meanings and utopian yearnings can be sheltered and shielded from surveillance.

### 2NC---Link

#### It’s especially bad because the “sociopathic demand” in question is that of bodily access---the 1AC’s epistemology posits that Black and disabled people’s demands for inclusion are sociopathic, which is obviously racist and ableist.

1AC Harney et. al. 18 [Kansas] – Stefano Harney, professor at Singapore Management University, Niccolò Cuppini and Mattia Frapporti, Department Member of Independent Researcher & Department Member of Universitá di Bologna, “Logistics Genealogies: a dialogue with Stefano Harney”, September 2018, <http://www.intotheblackbox.com/articoli/logistics-genealogies-a-dialogue-with-stefano-harney/>, DOA: 11/15/2019)//shreyas

Answer 1: Modern logistics is a commercial logistics, with all the multiple sources that feed what Cedric Robinson calls racial capitalism. And it’s a capitalist science. Even today’s military logistics is most commonly outsourced to commercial firms, who make huge profits off the logistics of contemporary permanent war. As a commercial logistics, as a capitalist science, it can be traced directly and emphatically to the Atlantic slave trade. The Atlantic slave trade was the birth of modern logistics, as it was also the birth of a new kind of war on the human species, and of racial capitalism, which amounts to saying the same thing. This trade entailed the first global movement of mass commodities, voluminous and grotesque. Moreover these humans were also perishable and volatile commodities that could ‘go missing’ and were hard ‘to extract’ requiring cdeomplex, even diabolical, logistical technologies, supported by finance, insurance, law, and of course state and extra state violence. Ian Baucom locates the origins of modern insurance in the Atlantic slave trade in his important work Spectres of the Altantic. We know from Sergio Bologna how much contemporary finance and logistics are entwined in today’s over-leveraged global shipping industry, but this was true of the Atlantic slave trade too, where speculative finance was already at work. The story of the Zong slave ship is central to Baucom’s account, and is also beautifully, unbearably rendered by M. NorbeSe Philip in her book-length poem Zong!, capturing what the birth of modern logistics did to any possible project of the human by bringing finance and logistics together in a devilish alliance over the commodity that really ‘could speak,’ the ‘thing’ that talks or is somehow in-touch, neither subject nor proper object, a massive, subterranean, ethereal, undercommon threat to the individuation of modern ‘Man’ emerging at the same time. But the Atlantic slave trade was also the birth of modern logistics because modern logistics is not just about how to transport large amounts of commodities or information or energy, nor even how to move these efficiently, but also about the sociopathic demand for access: topographical, jurisdictional, but as importantly bodily and social access. The nearly complete access that was imposed upon the African enslaved, upon the African continent, and upon the lands and indigenous peoples settled for plantations, this kind of access remains the ambition of logistics today, and it is for this reason that the slave trade remains so contemporary, that abolition as Jared Sexton rightly says is yet to come. And we might add this abolition requires the abolishment of logistics which in its flows created a people without standing anywhere. We act in abolition not for a ground to stand on but for groundations beyond standing. Modern logistics, with its warehousing and its containers is as much about controlling the flow as ensuring the flow, as much about the interface of movement of commodities and financialisation of commodities as it is about just getting goods somewhere. That interface is an opportunity for speculation and today the line itself, the supply line and the assembly line, their speed, efficiency and metrics are source of massive financial speculation. This is also the horrific legacy of the Atlantic slave trade, the containerisation of people, of the sociopathic access demanded to labour and sex, and the storage, in forts, in the hold. And even more murderously, the elimination of goods, of cargo, when the price falls, or considerations of finance as in the incident of the slave ship the Zong, in which 133 enslaved persons were thrown overboard for insurance purposes during a logistical operation. In short, this aggregated access allowed for the most evil calculations about the perishability of goods, the planned obsolesence of products, and the cost of replacement, in a word financial speculation on the supply line that was in the case of the African enslaved in the Atlantic trade often indistinguishable from the assembly line. Marx said the first thing the worker makes is himself. The slave was worker on the line and at the same time the supply coming off the line and into the line. The same concerns with speculation on the line, the line as a modulation of investment and exploitation of labour are still found today at Walmart or Starbuck’s, not so far from their origins, at least for the most part. As Susan Zieger reminds us in her study of ‘Box’ Brown and logistics – he was the slave who mailed himself in a box to ‘freedom’ from the slave-plantation South to the slave-dependent North in the United States – logistics incorporates loss in its logics. As Fred Moten and I say logistics tracks us because it assumes fugitivity. Indeed what is called surveillance might also be called preemptive logistics. It is possible that all we know of surveillance studies, including its most incisive work in black surveillance like Simone Browne’s, could also go under the name preemptive logistics, even predictive logistics, the anticipation not of resistance but of a kind of impenetrability even in the give. In other words, our entangled, indeterminate, undercommon, rub-up of curvy lines, kinks, loops, and crooked lines summon logistics. It reacts to our sumptuous tangle. Our entanglement requires them to draw up contingency plans which are plans to make our indeterminacy mere contingency, to account for what goes missing. Logistics is the science of loss, the science of their lost means, which is to say it will always be the white science and the science of being white. Logistics is the science of their loss, not ours, though we, and those closest to blackness in particular, suffer horrific losses from their loss.

### 2NC---Extra Impact

#### Even the casual use of language is deserving of rejection.

Girlboss no date (Girlboss, a professional network for ambitious women, “Your Difficult Co-Workers Are Not “Sociopaths.” Here’s Why Words Matter,” <https://www.girlboss.com/read/calling-coworkers-psychopaths>, DOA: 11-8-2020) //Snowball //language substitute provided

Your Difficult Co-Workers Are Not “Sociopaths.” Here’s Why Words Matter.

The use of these derogatory (yet commonplace) terms like “crazy” pathologizes our co-workers; here’s why that’s more dangerous than you might realize.

It’s a scene that’s all too familiar: After a tough day at work, while unloading over a glass of happy hour wine with co-workers, the complaints start rolling out: Your boss is a total psycho. That HR lady is crazy. Sheila’s new counterpart is an absolute narcissist.

If you yourself haven’t been the perpetrator of a similar conversation, you’ve almost certainly born witness to it in the last week or day or hour; one would be hard pressed to pass a day in which these terms—adapted from psychology and weaponized to be derogatory—were not thrown around with all the regularity of breathing.

And while it’s true that the conversation surrounding the problematic use of the word “crazy”—which is disproportionately used as a derogatory term against women—has been robust in recent years—you don’t need to be a sociologist or linguist to realize that we’re a long ways from eradicating the word from our daily vernacular.

But the effects of ableist language can have farther-reaching effects that most of us realize. Beyond “crazy” being a word embedded with a long history of misogyny, the casual misuse of terms like “psycho” and “insane” reinforces a stigma surrounding mental health issues that our culture desperately needs to eradicate, considering 1 in 5 adults in the US live with a mental illness in a given year.

As Dr. Lauren Harb, a clinical psychologist at Silver Lake Psychotherapy puts it: “The misuse of clinical terminology leads to widespread misunderstanding about what certain diagnoses actually look like, as well as shame about getting a mental health diagnosis.”

Psychosis—the clinical term for which “psycho” is shorthand—is characterized by very specific symptoms that are almost always a far cry from the behaviors someone is attempting to describe when they call a co-worker a “psycho” (i.e. much as he or she might bug you, your supervisor curtly asking you to file your TPS report on time does not qualify as psychopathic behavior).

“In my experience, it’s usually an attempt to describe a person whose behavior is … out of the ordinary. [Patients] are often talking about someone who is having difficulty regulating their emotions or remaining calm during conflict,” adds Dr. Harb.

But the potential for harm in describing someone as “psycho” is significant: “A diagnosis is really meant to help understand a person’s set of symptoms and deliver the most appropriate treatment,” she says. “Also, using mental health terminology to describe un-remarkable, every day behavior minimizes the severity of certain disorders that really do require clinical attention.”

“For instance, people often use ‘bipolar’ to describe someone who has a mood swing or a change of mind, or they say ‘I’m OCD’ to express that they like to be organized. In reality, if someone actually meets criteria for one of these disorders, it can be very impairing, and very hurtful when people underestimate the full extent of their impairment.”

The use of ableist language employed in everyday, casual settings, is something that disability justice activist Lydia X. Z. Brown confronts regularly in their work to raise awareness around ableist violence as a broad, systemic issue. “Much of the time, people who do this aren’t having conscious thoughts demeaning people with psychosocial disabilities,” they say. “Nevertheless, they are exemplifying a socially pervasive belief system that only some people’s minds are healthy, valuable, worthy, or desirable.”

And Brown points out that the misuse of this language is detrimental to identifying the problems that may truly be underlying the conflict: “Because of ableism, it’s easier to scapegoat disability rather than naming actual problems like unchecked aggression, willful lack of empathy, racism, or misogyny.”

### 2NC---AT Reps Don’t Matter

#### Ableism sustains itself through discourse and rhetoric.

Cherney 11 – PhD, Prof @ Wayne State University, Department of Communications, (James L, 2011, Disability Studies Quarterly, “The Rhetoric of Ableism”, Vol 31, No 3, <http://dsq-sds.org/article/view/1665/1606>)

In this essay I analyze ableism as a rhetorical problem for three reasons. First, ableist culture sustains and perpetuates itself via rhetoric; the ways of interpreting disability and assumptions about bodies that produce ableism are learned. The previous generation teaches it to the next and cultures spread it to each other through modes of intercultural exchange. Adopting a rhetorical perspective to the problem of ableism thus exposes the social systems that keep it alive. This informs my second reason for viewing ableism as rhetoric, as revealing how it thrives suggests ways of curtailing its growth and promoting its demise. Many of the strategies already adopted by disability rights activists to confront ableism explicitly or implicitly address it as rhetoric. Public demonstrations, countercultural performances, autobiography, transformative histories of disability and disabling practices, and critiques of ableist films and novels all apply rhetorical solutions to the problem. Identifying ableism as rhetoric and exploring its systems dynamic reveals how these corrective practices work. We can use such information to refine the successful techniques, reinvent those that fail, and realize new tactics. Third, I contend that any means of challenging ableism must eventually encounter its rhetorical power. As I explain below, ableism is that most insidious form of rhetoric that has become reified and so widely accepted as common sense that it denies its own rhetoricity—it "goes without saying." To fully address it we must name its presence, for cultural assumptions accepted uncritically adopt the mantle of "simple truth" and become extremely difficult to rebut. As the neologism "ableism" itself testifies, we need new words to reveal the places it resides and new language to describe how it feeds. Without doing so, ableist ways of thinking and interpreting will operate as the context for making sense of any acts challenging discrimination, which undermines their impact, reduces their symbolic potential, and can even transform them into superficial measures that give the appearance of change yet elide a recalcitrant ableist system.